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Foreword
In 1998, a decision was made to launch the PPIC Statewide Survey.
The decision was made for two reasons.  First, it was readily apparent that
the initiative process in California had come to dominate some of the most
important public policy decisions made in recent decades.  If the ballot
box was becoming a key source of policy decisionmaking, it was obvious
that we all needed to understand the public’s use of this important vehicle
for complementing the representative process in Sacramento.  Second,
with a state as big and complex as California, a careful monitoring of
public opinion seemed essential to anticipating issues important to voters
and to identifying feasible options for resolving recurring and contentious
issues that often result in gridlock and hastily launched initiatives.
Over 100,000 Californians have been interviewed in the six years
since the first PPIC Statewide Survey was fielded.  As we anticipated, the
results are often surprising.  The desire for greater government benefits
but the unwillingness to pay for them through conventional taxes is
strong and consistent.  The preference for a single-family detached home
and the willingness to pay for it with ever-longer commutes is surprising,
even by California standards of commute times.  Active resident
involvement with California’s parks and recreation areas and a preference
for maintaining high environmental standards suggest that, for the voters
at least, more could be done on this front without endangering the
political standing of our representatives.  Surely one of the most
surprising findings of all is the consistently high marks respondents give
to the initiative process.  And now we learn from our latest round of
PPIC survey findings that voter distrust of government has grown even
more intense as a result of the gubernatorial election of 2002.
In this report, Mark Baldassare, founder and director of the PPIC
Statewide Survey, and his colleagues focus on an issue that should be of
concern to every elected official in California—negative campaigning—
which damages not only both opponents but also the democratic process
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itself by sowing disillusion, distrust, and cynicism among voters, many
of whom then decide not to vote for either candidate.  The authors
also find a steady and dramatic decline in turnout in gubernatorial
elections—from 70 percent of registered voters in 1982 to just 50
percent in 2002.  Although there are a number of reasons for this decline
in voter participation, only three in 10 Californians said that they were
satisfied with the discussion of issues facing the state during the 2002
campaign.  Voters wanted debates on the issues by the candidates—and
they did not get what they wanted.  So, they stayed away from the polls.
At the same time, gubernatorial campaign expenditures reached an all-
time high—mostly for the purchase of ad time on TV.  And yet, only
one in four likely voters just before the election in 2002 said that the
campaign advertisements were helpful in making a decision about voting.
Respondents expressed strong support for such election options as
campaign finance reform, candidate debates, public disclosure, and
voluntarily adopted codes and pledges of campaign conduct.  These
are straightforward suggestions and the ones most likely to survive
constitutional challenges.  Will representatives in Sacramento, along with
the governor, take the lead in thinking through these options?  Will elected
officials listen to the message being sent by the state’s eligible voters?  How
low will trust in state government have to drift before action is taken?
And will the action come from Sacramento or from the ballot box once
again?  All of these questions are raised by the authors in one of the most
discouraging set of findings yet to emerge from the PPIC Statewide
Survey.  As in many other areas of public policy, there are practical
solutions to the problems outlined above.  The authors suggest that if
nothing is done in Sacramento, voters will once again take it into their
own hands at the ballot box.  This latest set of findings from the PPIC
Statewide Survey should serve as a high-profile warning that something
needs to be done to turn the tide on a level of distrust in government that
is doing serious damage to the democratic process in California.
David W. Lyon
President and CEO
Public Policy Institute of California
vSummary
The California governor’s election in November 2002 is widely
regarded by scholars, political consultants, media commentators, and
leaders of the political parties as one of the low points in the state’s
political history.  However, the qualities of the political campaigning that
led to this assessment—high expenditures, negative advertising, and low
voter turnout—are all indicative of recent trends in California elections.
This is the backdrop against which in this report we examine the public’s
views on campaigning and elections, analyze the ways that the conduct of
campaigns is related to voter dissatisfaction and government distrust, and
discuss what Californians would like to see changed about their state’s
campaigns and elections.
In 2002, a Democratic governor who won a landslide victory four
years earlier, Gray Davis, defeated a Republican political novice, Bill
Simon, in a surprisingly close contest that will be best remembered for its
nasty tone and lack of substance.  The governor’s popularity had suffered
as the state faced a number of fiscal and economic calamities—including
the electricity crisis that resulted from a flawed deregulation law, a
dramatic slowdown in the state’s booming economy, and a multibillion-
dollar deficit in the state government’s budget.  But the Davis-Simon
matchup may never have occurred without the Democratic incumbent
having spent millions of dollars in the GOP primary to help defeat
Richard Riordan, a politically moderate candidate who was considered
more “electable.” Davis and Simon waged a campaign of harsh words
from the outset that focused on attacks and counterattacks revolving
around their personal character—including allegations that there were
links between the governor’s campaign fund-raising and his decisions in
office, and that his GOP opponent had been involved in illegal and
incompetent business dealings.  They faced off in a live televised debate
on the issues only once during the fall campaign.  The two candidates
spent their multimillion-dollar war chests on negative television
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advertisements, beamed into the homes of millions of Californians,
which were carefully crafted to destroy the public’s image of their
opponents.
In the end, the November 2002 election generated the highest
campaign expenditures and the lowest voter turnout in state history.
The exit polls found that most of those who voted had unfavorable
images of both candidates.  Governor Davis won the election by a slim
five-point margin over Simon (47% to 42%).  Almost immediately,
Davis’s political opponents seized on the governor’s low approval ratings
and the low vote threshold for qualifying a recall made possible by the
record low turnout in the November election.  With an infusion of cash
from a wealthy supporter, the 900,000-plus signatures needed to force a
special election in October 2003 were collected, and the state’s voters
took the unprecedented action of removing a governor from office.  The
voters replaced Davis with Arnold Schwarzenegger less than a year after
the incumbent’s reelection.  Although voters are currently happy with
their new governor, surveys indicate that they still remain dissatisfied
with political campaigns and elections and are distrustful of state
government.
The public opinion information presented in this report is based
largely on the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) Statewide
Surveys conducted during the 2002 elections.  In all, we conducted 10
surveys of over 20,000 Californians.  No preelection survey of ours has
ever been more meaningful and timely than the special survey of 2,000
Californians on political campaigns during the last week before the
November election.  That project is the centerpiece of this report, which
seeks to answer the following questions about the relationships between
voters and political campaigns in the state of California:
• What are the recent trends in California’s voter registration,
voter turnout, and campaign expenditures in statewide and
legislative elections?  What is the relationship between money
spent, voter turnout, and winning state elections?
• What were the public’s perceptions of the campaigns for the
governor’s race in 2002, what are their views on negative
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advertising by candidates, and what are the factors related to
dissatisfaction with the state’s elections?
• What are the recent trends in the public’s trust in state and
federal government, and to what extent is the conduct of
political campaigns a contributing factor in the public’s distrust
of state government today?
• What, if anything, does the public want to do to change the
nature of political campaigns and elections in California?  How
much support is there for campaign finance reform, public
debates, increasing public disclosure by the candidates, and
adopting voluntary codes of campaign conduct?
We summarize our major findings below.
Voting and Elections in California
California’s elections over the past two decades have occurred in the
context of rapid population growth and a fundamental shift in the state’s
demography.  The addition of over 10 million people increased
California’s congressional delegation from 43 to 53 seats between 1980
and 2000.  In the meantime, the ethnic and racial mix of the potential
electorate has shifted significantly as the state has been transformed
through immigration.  Registered voters are predominantly white, yet a
growing share are Latinos, blacks, and Asians.  Lower levels of total voter
eligibility have significantly decreased the share of registered voters as a
percentage of the adult population to 60 percent, although the share of
eligible voters who are registered to vote has remained fairly stable at
about 70 percent.  Similar to the rest of the nation, California is showing
signs of declining voter turnout.
In presidential election years since 1980, turnout has declined
overall, but it has not declined steadily.  In contrast, turnout in
California’s gubernatorial elections—which occur in the nonpresidential
national election years—decreased steadily and dramatically between
1982 and 2002.  Over the course of the past 20 years, turnout in
presidential races has dropped 6 percentage points, whereas turnout in
California’s gubernatorial elections has dropped almost 20 percentage
points, from 70 percent in 1982 to 51 percent in 2002.
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Historically low turnout in the 2002 governor’s race occurred in the
context of another ongoing trend—steadily increasing campaign
expenditures since the early 1980s, as shown in Figure S.1.  The last six
gubernatorial races in California have all been marked by new record
highs in expenditures.  The most dramatic increase was in 2002, when
expenditures increased by almost $40 million from the previous election
year—to nearly $98 million.  Once again, the candidate who spent the
most money won, which has been the trend in every governor’s election
since 1986.  Much campaign funding is steered toward television
commercials and, following another trend in recent state elections,
toward negative advertising aimed at undermining the credibility of the
political opponent.  Such political campaigns are not designed to
encourage higher voter turnout because their focus is on winning.  We
hypothesize that these trends have taken a toll on public perceptions of
candidates, campaigns, and elections in California and on trust in state
government.
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Figure S.1—Gubernatorial Campaign Expenditures and Voter Turnout
in California, 1982–2002
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Voters’ Perceptions of Political Campaigns
In recent years, Californians have grown increasingly dissatisfied
with political campaigns in their state.  In the PPIC Statewide Surveys
we have conducted since the 1998 election, Californians have expressed
their dissatisfaction with their candidate choices and their unhappiness
with the way campaigns are run.  Earlier polls reveal similar trends in
public opinion about campaigns and elections.
During the fall 2002 election, only about four in 10 residents said
that they were satisfied with the choice of candidates for governor.
Similarly, almost four in 10 Californians said that, in general, elections
had gotten worse in the past 10 years, and 42 percent said that the ethics
and values in campaigns had grown worse over the past decade.  Likely
voters were even more negative about the current state of campaigns,
with half (49%) saying that elections had generally gotten worse and 54
percent saying that election ethics and values had gotten worse.
Although about eight in 10 Californians said that they had been
exposed to campaign advertising in the course of the fall 2002 campaign,
only 33 percent said that the advertisements were helpful in making a
decision about voting.  Moreover, only one in four likely voters said that
the candidate advertisements they had seen were helpful.
Much of the dissatisfaction that Californians say they feel toward
elections is focused on negative campaigning.  In the PPIC Statewide
Survey, 58 percent of those who were asked whether Gray Davis and Bill
Simon should be critical of each other said that they should not, because
campaigns today are too negative.
Indeed, our preelection survey used an approach that asked about
the preferred campaign behavior of Davis and Simon and then compared
the responses of the candidates’ supporters and opponents.  Here are
some of the key results from that survey:  (1) Candidates who attack
their opponent run the risk of negative effects on their own image among
their supporters; (2) all of the candidates’ responses to being attacked
were equally unpopular, even including arguing that the basis for the
attack was untrue; (3) the only responses to candidate attacks that were
correlated with positive rankings of the candidates were not making a
counterattack or ignoring an attack; and (4) the ability of negative
xadvertising to decrease the popularity of the candidate who is being
attacked must be weighed against the likely outcome of decreasing the
popularity of the attacker.
Potential voters said that they did not receive all of the information
they needed to make a decision in the 2002 California election.  In
repeated preelection surveys, seven in 10 Californians said that above all
else, they would like to know candidates’ stands on the issues.  Notably,
however, this demand for information about issues was not met in the
2002 campaign.  In the same preelection surveys, only three in 10 said
that they were satisfied with the discussion of issues facing the state
during the campaign.
On top of this frustration with the content of the campaign was
disappointment with the means that candidates use to deliver campaign
messages.  When asked how they prefer to learn about candidates, voters
chose debates more than any other means of communication.  However,
in the 2002 campaign, there was only one debate between the
candidates.  Moreover, although the gubernatorial candidates relied
heavily on television advertising, about four in 10 Californians said that
they would view candidates less favorably when they primarily used
television advertising to get their message to voters.
In sum, candidates hurt their own images by campaigning
negatively, by providing inadequate information to voters, and by relying
too heavily on television advertising to connect with the voters.  This
strategy may still result in victory, but it could depress the turnout for
the winner.  Thus, there are political risks in the short run and the long
run for the political candidate.  Equally important, attack campaigns,
even beyond their effects on turnout, may engender lasting feelings of
distrust in government.
Political Campaigns and Distrust in Government
Political observers have long suspected that recent trends in
campaign practices such as negative advertising may be linked to steadily
declining trust in government.  The evidence from our November 2002
PPIC Statewide Survey, as well as past studies of trust in government in
California, suggests that campaigns do have an effect on political trust.
Californians’ trust in state government declined during the 2002 election
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campaign and has not returned to previous levels in the wake of the recall
of Governor Davis and his replacement by Arnold Schwarzenegger, who
currently enjoys high overall job approval ratings.  Negative perceptions
of campaigns appear to be a contributing factor for declining trust, and
confidence seems to be difficult to restore once the public loses faith in
government.
The level of trust in the federal government expressed by California
residents actually increased since our first PPIC Statewide Survey in April
1998, up to and including the November 2002 election—in part a
reaction to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.  As of this writing,
trust in the federal government has dropped somewhat below the levels
we recorded before the 2002 elections.  In contrast, trust in state
government was moving in a downward direction over time.  Trust in
state government reached its peak in 2001 and early 2002, with nearly
half of all Californians (47%) saying that they trusted state government
to do what is right just about always or most of the time.  By August
2002, about one in three Californians (37%) said that they trusted the
state government.  In the months following the November 2002
election, trust in the state government drifted to significantly lower levels
and, as of this writing, it has not improved to the levels recorded in the
summer and fall leading up to the 2002 election.
We conducted a multivariate analysis to determine the factors most
highly correlated with distrust in state government.  For both the public
at large and likely voters, negative assessments of incumbent Governor
Gray Davis, negative perceptions of the campaign, and Independent
voter status were all significantly correlated with more distrust in state
government.  For all adults, strong Republicans had more distrust in
state government than others did at the time, whereas Latinos had more
trust than other racial/ethnic groups in state government.  Greater
interest in politics was also associated with more trust in state
government.
Public Support for Political Campaign Reforms
We looked at a wide variety of political reforms that were chosen
because they are most likely to survive constitutional challenges and
because they are the types of policy proposals that have been considered
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in state contexts and discussed in the national political arena in recent
years.  We tested public support for the following: campaign finance
reforms, candidate debates, public disclosure, and voluntarily adopted
codes and pledges of campaign conduct by the candidates.  We found
considerable interest in changing the status quo of California’s
campaigns and elections on all of these dimensions.
The issue of campaign finance was prominent in the 2002 governor’s
race, given the record spending of nearly $100 million by the two major
party candidates.  Perhaps most surprising of all, given the fiscally
conservative nature of Californians, 57 percent of likely voters thought
that public, rather than private, financing of campaigns was a good idea.
This finding suggests that recent negative experiences with state
campaigns, such as the 2002 governor’s race, had made many voters
receptive to the public paying the tab for the election process.
Californians have been telling us in surveys that they are frustrated
with the emphasis of statewide political campaigns on 30-second
television commercials.  What would they prefer instead?  Two in three
likely voters said that more debates in the 2002 gubernatorial contest
would have made the election campaign better.  And when asked
whether they would favor or oppose an initiative that would require five
prime-time broadcast gubernatorial debates, 60 percent were in favor of
the proposal.  Voter support for election reforms that provide more
personal contact with the candidates suggests another area for
improvement.
Disclosure is a key ingredient in elections because voters need access
to accurate information when making ballot choices.  Among likely
voters, 71 percent said that the immediate disclosure of campaign
contributions would make them more favorably disposed toward a
candidate.  By contrast, fewer say that they would have a positive
impression of candidates who released their tax forms or medical records.
The candidates’ sources and amounts of financial support are important
to voters, and their preferences for more information point to a potential
avenue for political reform.
Candidates cannot be compelled to avoid personal attacks and
negative campaigns for first amendment reasons.  But what if candidates
can be induced to do so by signing pledges that held them accountable
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during the course of a political campaign?  Our survey suggests that
California voters are open to this idea:  Seventy-seven percent of likely
voters said that they would view candidates more favorably if they signed
a pledge or a code of conduct to “run a truthful, fair, and clean
campaign,” and over 70 percent of likely voters said that they would view
a candidate more favorably if he or she signed a code of conduct to run
“an issue-oriented campaign.”  The support among likely voters was
almost equally high for candidates who would sign a code of conduct
“not to use race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or age as a basis for
attack.”  Despite the practical limitations of codes of conduct, many
voters are keen on the idea of them because they offer a greater likelihood
of a campaign focusing on the issues and a break from the negative tone
of today’s California campaigns.
The California public expressed a high level of dissatisfaction with
the negative tone of the 2002 governor’s election, the limited access they
had to the candidates, and the lack of attention to the issues confronting
the state.  The most expensive governor’s race in the state’s history
resulted in the lowest voter turnout and one of the nastiest political
campaigns on record—all following trends in recent state elections and
likely to continue unless there is a concerted effort to change the nature
of elections.
In the end, the campaigns’ focus on negative advertising appeared to
harm both the candidate doing the attacking and the candidate who was
attacked.  Although the candidate who spent the most money
campaigning in this manner won, we found that there are political risks
to spending so much money on negative advertising.  The aftermath of
Davis’s narrow victory in a low turnout election—a recall in which the
incumbent found it difficult to mobilize his support base to fight off the
GOP’s attempt to remove him from office—highlights the vulnerabilities
of this political strategy.  If the current trends of public dissatisfaction
and voter disengagement continue, there could be more serious
consequences—not the least of which is declining trust in state
government and its elected officials—endangering the future of
democratic society in California.
The public’s frustration with state politics was evident in the course
of the 2002 governor’s race, and it peaked in 2003 when California
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voters removed the winner from office.  But the recall did not address the
underlying problem of negative campaigns and declining turnout in
gubernatorial elections.  California voters, deeply dissatisfied, have
indicated their preferences for a new type of campaign
behavior—increased financial disclosure, more public debates, campaign
finance reform, and candidate codes of conduct—most of which could
be implemented in time for the 2006 governor’s election.  Given their
frustration with the status quo and their support for change, the voters
may take the matter of election reform into their own hands through the
initiative process.
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11. Recent Trends in California
Elections
Once upon a time, California voters stood in line to shake hands at
political rallies with would-be officeholders and waited at train stations
for their whistle-stop tours.  Now, they are most accustomed to seeing
candidates through the lens of 30-second television commercials beamed
into their living rooms.  Elections in California have become more
professionalized in recent decades—and more expensive.  Consultants
have become more knowledgeable about how to run winning campaigns.
Candidates are more informed than ever by polls and focus groups about
what the voters want.  Their messages are carefully tested before they are
ever seen or heard by voters.
Yet, for all this expertise and money devoted to figuring out how to
win elections, Californians tell us in our public opinion surveys that they
are dissatisfied with the state’s election process and the negative tone of
campaigns.  Many Californians are also forgoing a benefit and a
responsibility of U.S. citizenship—registering to vote—and many of
those who are registered do not turn out to cast their ballots on Election
Day.  This report explores the level and sources of discontent with
political campaigns among Californians, examines some of the critical
implications of this discontent for the democratic process, and considers
the public’s views on how to improve the state’s elections in the future.
California’s elections have become more expensive as the state’s
population has grown and its demography has been changing.  The
defining characteristics of California’s elections are that they encompass a
large geographic area and a racially and ethnically diverse electorate.
These factors set the stage for media driven campaigns that focus on
reaching voters through television commercials, adding high costs to all
2statewide campaigns and leading to complex decisions that all statewide
candidates face in trying to reach diverse audiences.
Since 1980, California’s population has increased by almost 50
percent—from less than 24 million, to over 35 million people in the year
2002 (Table 1.1).  In the late 1980s, the population grew by over 5
percent in each election cycle.  In the recession of the early 1990s, it
slowed to approximately half a million new people per election cycle.
But in the two years preceding both the 2000 and the 2002 election, the
California population grew by more than one million people.
Meanwhile, decades of foreign immigration and racial and ethnic
change have transformed California into the first large “majority-
minority” state where whites make up less than half of the total
population.  As of this writing, about one in three residents is Latino in
ethnic origin, and the remaining one in six adults is Asian, black, or of
another racial category.  Moreover, substantial proportions of Asians and
Latinos in California are either immigrants or children of immigrants
(Baldassare, 2000, 2002).
Although not all of this new population was eligible to vote—
because of either age disqualification or noncitizenship—the addition of
over 10 million people in 20 years increased California’s Congressional
Table 1.1
Population Change in California, 1980–2002
Year
Population
(thousands)
Population
Increase
(thousands)
Percentage
Increase
1980 23,782 525 2.3
1982 24,805 1,023 4.3
1984 25,816 1,011 4.1
1986 27,052 1,236 4.8
1988 28,393 1,341 5.0
1990 29,828 1,435 5.1
1992 30,987 1,159 3.9
1994 31,523 536 1.7
1996 31,962 439 1.4
1998 32,862 900 2.8
2000 34,088 1,226 3.7
2002 35,336 1,248 3.7
SOURCE:  California Department of Finance (2003).
3delegation from 43 to 53 seats between 1980 and 2000.  Moreover,
despite the voter eligibility obstacles resulting from immigration that
slow the translation from population growth to electoral change, the
ethnic and racial mix of the electorate has been shifting significantly over
the past decade.  In the most recent state elections, about one in four
voters was Latino, Asian, or black (Baldassare, 2002).
These demographic and racial/ethnic shifts in the population are
important to acknowledge because it would be unfair to claim that
trends in political campaigning alone account for all of the decline in
voter participation in recent years.  Irrespective of voter registration,
lower levels of total voter eligibility have decreased the share of voters as a
fraction of the total adult population.  In the 1980s, the percentage of
adult residents eligible to vote in elections remained at a nearly constant
rate of 65 percent (Table 1.2).  By the early 1990s, the share of the adult
population eligible to vote in California dropped sharply, to 58 percent.
Table 1.2
Total Population, Eligible Voters, and Registered Voters in California,
1980–2002
Year
Total
Population
(thousands)
Eligible
Voters
(thousands)
%
Eligible
Registered
Voters
(thousands)
%
Registered
1980 23,669 15,384 65 11,362 74
1982 24,500 15,984 65 11,559 72
1984 25,550 16,582 65 13,074 79
1986 26,444 17,561 66 12,834 73
1988 28,592 19,052 67 14,005 74
1990 29,800 19,245 65 13,478 70
1992 31,000 20,864 67 15,101 73
1994 32,000 18,496 58 14,724 78
1996 32,344 19,527 60 15,602 80
1998 33,252 20,806 63 14,969 72
2000 34,336 21,461 63 15,707 73
2002 35,802 21,451 60 15,303 71
SOURCE:  Field Poll (2002).
NOTE:  Population estimates are slightly different from those presented
in Table 1.1.
4The share has increased slightly since that time, with a little more than
60 percent of the adult population eligible to vote in California elections
by 2002.
Whatever the changes in numbers eligible to vote in the adult
population, however, the proportion of eligible voters who register to
vote has remained fairly stable, with only a few exceptions.  Since 1980,
an estimated 70 percent or more of those eligible to vote have registered.
During the last 20 years, the share of eligible voters registering to vote
has increased only slightly in a few election years.  A much larger share
than usual—79 percent of those eligible to vote—registered during the
1984 presidential election cycle, which pitted Ronald Reagan against
Walter Mondale.  In the 1994 gubernatorial election cycle, where
Kathleen Brown faced Pete Wilson, 78 percent of those eligible to vote
were registered.  And in 1996—a presidential year that featured not only
the two major party candidates, Bill Clinton and Bob Dole—but also a
surge in new Latino voters in response to voter registration drives and the
passage in 1994 of an anti-illegal immigrant initiative—eight in 10 of
those eligible to vote were registered.  With the exception of these years,
the levels of voter registration have remained stable, despite many efforts
to increase voter registration among the legions of young adults and new
U.S. citizens.
Not all of the registered voters in California actually go to the polls
on Election Day.  Similar to the rest of the nation, California has shown
signs of decreased voter turnout in terms of the share of registered voters
going to the polls.  The national enfranchisement of 18-to-20 year olds
in 1972 led to a decline in the percentage of registered voters turning out
nationwide, because young adults are less likely to vote than any other
age group.  The extensive research by Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980)
notes that some of the causes of low voter turnout among young adults
may be residential mobility, which makes registration more difficult, or
lower levels of education; individuals with college degrees, which are
rarely acquired before the early twenties, are much more likely to vote.
However, although voter turnout in California has declined overall
in presidential election years since 1980, it has not declined steadily
(Table 1.3).  Whereas only two in three registered voters turned out in
5Table 1.3
Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections
in California, 1980–2000
Year
% of Registered
Voters
1980 77
1984 75
1988 73
1992 75
1996 66
2000 71
SOURCE:  California Secretary
of State (2000).
1996, the share of registered adults voting in the 2000 election increased
by 5 percentage points to 71 percent, which is near the levels of turnout
seen in 1988 (73%) and only slightly lower than turnout rates in 1984
(75%) and 1992, when three in four of those registered actually voted.
Overall, turnout rates in presidential elections in California have been
inconsistent across election cycles but have not dropped significantly in
the past two decades.
In contrast, turnout in California’s gubernatorial elections—which
occur in the nonpresidential national election years—has decreased
dramatically between 1982 and 2002.  California, like 36 other states
and territories, elects its governor in a nonpresidential election
year—that is, two years after the presidential race.  Seven other states and
territories also elect governors in a nonpresidential election year but not
at the two-year Congressional election interval.
Without the national attention that comes with the race for
president, registered voters are less likely to participate in off-year
elections.  Turnout in the gubernatorial election years in California has
been lower than turnout in presidential years in every election cycle since
1912, the first election cycle for which the California Secretary of State
collected election data.  Moreover, the gap in voting between presidential
election years and gubernatorial election years has increased in recent
6decades because the turnout in presidential years has changed little
whereas turnout in gubernatorial years has declined steadily.
Over the past 20 years, voter turnout in presidential races has
dropped 6 percent, whereas voter turnout in gubernatorial election years
has dropped almost 20 percent, from 70 percent in 1982 to 51 percent
in 2002 (Table 1.4).  The declining turnout in gubernatorial elections
happened in two stages.  After the 1982 elections, turnout dropped 11
percentage points to 59 percent and remained at about the 60 percent
level until 1998.  And then, in 2002, at the end of a gubernatorial race
between Gray Davis and Bill Simon that received national recognition
for its high expenditures and the negative tone of the campaigning,
turnout dropped again, to only about half of all registered voters.
The decline in voter turnout in 1986 and 2002 does not reflect
dramatic changes in the underlying adult population.  As discussed
above, during these years, California was experiencing steady population
growth and was integrating immigrants into the voting rolls at a fairly
constant rate.  The drop in turnout in 2002 is noteworthy, since it
represents a large percentage decline in voter participation from the
previous general election.  The level of voter turnout in November 2002
is comparable to that of traditionally poorly attended special elections;
the closest comparable race was the 1973 special election in California,
which had a similarly low turnout of 48 percent.
Table 1.4
Voter Turnout in Gubernatorial Elections
in California, 1982–2002
Year
% of Registered
Voters
1982 70
1986 59
1990 59
1994 60
1998 58
2002 51
SOURCE:  California Secretary
of State (2002).
7Although the last six gubernatorial races in California have nearly all
been marked by new record highs in expenditures, no such pattern is
evident in reviewing aggregate spending in state legislative races between
1980 and 1998 (California Secretary of State, 1998; note:  Data after
1998 were not available).  California has 80 Assembly seats, which means
that candidates must run every two years; California’s 40 Senate seats
have four-year terms, with approximately half of the seats in contention
every two years.  For instance, total spending in primary and general
elections increased between 1982 ($84 million) and 1986 ($99 million);
however, total spending in 1994 ($106 million) was higher than in 1998
($101 million) for all state legislative elections (all figures are in 2002 real
dollars).  Since the passage of legislative term limits in 1990 took effect,
the cost of state legislative races has been over $100 million in every
election but, again, the available data suggest that total spending has
fluctuated rather than increased over time.
Federal legislative elections in California in this same time frame also
do not indicate a consistent upward trend in spending (U.S. Federal
Election Commission, 2004).  For example, the total amount spent in
California actually declined between 1982 ($52 million) and 1986 ($38
million), then increased sharply in 1992 ($80 million), and declined
from that level in 1994 ($58 million) when we look at all Congressional
elections in the state (all figures are in 2002 real dollars). Congressional
seats are not term-limited like state seats.  As a result, spending has
fluctuated from year to year, largely in response to contentious individual
races rather than to any structural changes.  In recent years, there have
been only a handful of competitive races as a result of a redistricting
process after 2000 that favored safe seats for both Democrats and
Republicans in office.  As contentious individual races surface in the
future, we expect to see the trend of fluctuations continue.
Candidates running for governor since 1982, meanwhile, have
increased their spending in every election year except 1994 (Table 1.5).
The most dramatic leap came in 2002, when overall expenditures
increased by almost $40 million from the previous election year.  In
earlier elections, the difference in expenditures from one election to the
8Table 1.5
Spending on Gubernatorial Elections in California, 1982–2002
Year Spending 2002 Dollars
1982 Tom Bradley (Dem) 6,803,633
George Deukmejian (Rep) 4,972,389
Total 11,776,022 22,602,969
1986 Tom Bradley (Dem) 6,137,522
George Deukmejian (Rep)a 9,565,125
Total 15,702,647 27,891,845
1990 Dianne Feinstein (Dem) 13,227,930
Pete Wilson (Rep) 16,028,590
Total 29,256,520 45,768,626
1994 Kathleen Brown (Dem) 12,251,634
Pete Wilson (Rep)a 19,555,243
Total 31,806,877 39,377,870
1998 Gray Davis (Dem) 28,642,125
Dan Lungren (Rep) 23,845,008
Total 52,487,133 58,788,186
2002 Gray Davis (Dem)a 64,261,067
Bill Simon (Rep) 33,595,244
Total 97,856,311 97,856,311
SOURCE:  California Secretary of State (2002).
NOTES:  Data on 2002 dollars are presented in 2002 real dollars using
the Consumer Price Index provided by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistics.  Winner is shown in boldface.
aIndicates incumbent.
next had always been less than $20 million (all figures are in 2002 real
dollars).  This change in expenditures over time does not reflect
structural changes; California governors were limited to two terms of
office long before the 1990 California initiative establishing legislative
term limits.  Although candidates for governor must reach increasing
numbers of people because of California’s increasing population, the
9growth in population between 1998 and 2002 was not large enough to
fully explain the dramatic increase in gubernatorial election spending.
Moreover, other statewide races, such as recent races for U.S. senator,
have not been marked by similar steady increases in spending.  For
example, the 1982 U.S. Senate race between Pete Wilson and Jerry
Brown, at a cost of $39 million (in 2002 dollars), was more expensive
than later Senate races with the exception of the 1994 race between
Dianne Feinstein and Michael Huffington, which was clearly an outlier
because it involved a Democratic incumbent and a millionaire GOP
challenger able to call upon personal wealth to finance this race.
It is noteworthy that the increased spending on gubernatorial
campaigns in recent years has been consistent even when considered as
spending on potential or actual voters.  The cost per vote cast has
increased substantially in 20 years, from $2.80 in 1982 to $12.64 in
2002 (Table 1.6).  Although the cost per eligible voter has increased at a
slower rate—a fact that reflects the increasing state population—the
Table 1.6
Cost per Voter of Gubernatorial Elections in California,
1982–2002
Year
$ Cost per
Vote Cast
$ Cost per
Registered Voter
$ Cost per
Eligible Voter
1982 2.80 1.96 1.41
1986 3.66 2.17 1.59
1990 5.79 3.40 2.38
1994 4.42 2.76 2.13
1998 6.82 3.93 2.83
2002 12.64 6.39 4.56
SOURCES:  California Secretary of State (2002); Field Poll
(2002).
NOTES:  The number of votes cast includes all ballots cast in
the election; however, in each election, a small fraction of ballots
did not include a vote for governor.  Data on cost per voter are
presented in 2002 real dollars using the Consumer Price Index
provided by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
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significant increase from $1.41 in 1982 to $4.56 in 2002 suggests that
population growth is not the only consideration.  The largest increase in
per capita costs, unsurprisingly, occurred between 1998 and 2002, when
the cost per eligible, registered, and actual voter in the election increased
respectively by 61 percent, 62 percent, and 85 percent.
What are the implications of the fact that continuing increases in
gubernatorial candidate spending coincide with decreases in voter
turnout during the same respective years in California?  First, just
because candidates spend money communicating to voters and voters are
more likely to be informed about the upcoming election and the
candidate choices does not necessarily lead to more political
participation.  Indeed, the purpose of campaign advertising may be to
encourage voting for your candidate and discourage voting for their
candidate.  As for the latter, acceptable outcomes for the political
consultant could include vote-switching or simply staying home on
Election Day.  In addition, more spending could mean more negative
advertising, which might dishearten potential voters and result in their
simply not voting.  Our analysis revealed a striking correlation between
campaign spending and winning a gubernatorial election in California:
Since 1986, the candidate who spent the most money won the election.
Gubernatorial elections have been distinctive from all other kinds of
statewide elections in California since the 1980s.  Unlike other kinds of
elections, the costs of gubernatorial races are steadily increasing, and
constituents are increasingly unwilling to vote for the gubernatorial
candidates running for office.  One factor that may explain the trend of
lower voter turnout may be the growing numbers of decline-to-state
voters in the California electorate, now accounting for about one in six
voters (Table 1.7).  The growth of Independent voters may be another
symptom of the deep disillusionment that California voters have for the
campaigns of major party candidates running for statewide offices
(Baldassare, 2002).
This low turnout is troubling for the state’s system of representative
democracy.  The governor is the most powerful officeholder in California
state politics and an important and high-profile symbol of the state’s
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Table 1.7
Political Party Affiliation of Registered Voters
in California, 2002
Affiliation
% of Registered
Voters
Democrat 45
Republican 35
Decline to state (Independent) 15
Other parties 5
SOURCE:  California Secretary of State (2002).
executive branch as well as of state government policymaking, yet the
statistics indicate that a smaller portion of the electorate is choosing the
governor over time.  Moreover, with the state’s changing demographics,
the voting population does not reflect the racial and ethnic mix of the
state’s adult population.
Results for 2002 indicate an extension if not an acceleration of
recent trends.  The candidates for governor convinced barely half of
registered voters to cast ballots, and they spent nearly $100 million in the
campaign.  Once again, the candidate who spent the most money was
the winner.  Less than a year after the 2002 election, however, Gray
Davis faced a first-ever recall, and the voters replaced him with Arnold
Schwarzenegger.
Has the experience of the 2003 recall changed the political climate?
There was clearly excitement about the recall and signs of greater interest
in state elections—61 percent of registered voters participated in the
2003 recall—but this increase in voter participation may be a short-lived
phenomenon driven by the unique nature of this election.  The March
2004 primary, with two state fiscal ballot measures that were heavily
promoted by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, attracted just 44 percent
of  registered voters to the polls (California Secretary of State, 2003,
2004).  Of course, voter response in the 2006 governor’s election will
provide a more definitive answer.
In this report, we argue that the low voter turnout in gubernatorial
elections reflects, at least in part, an increasing dissatisfaction with
political campaigning in California.  This trend of increasing
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dissatisfaction, in turn, is marked by a steady decline in the public’s trust
in state government and elected officials that has not been reversed by
the recent recall election.  In the remainder of this report, we look at
voters’ attitudes during the 2002 election—which offer the most recent
evidence from a long-term trend that has been evident in California for
some time—to understand why political campaigns have fallen out of
favor, and we discuss ways to reverse these troubling trends through a
variety of political and election reforms.   
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2. Political Campaigns and Voter
Dissatisfaction
In recent years, Californians have grown dissatisfied with political
campaigns and elections in their state. As we noted in Chapter 1, this
trend seems most evident in gubernatorial elections.  In the 2002
gubernatorial race, turnout declined to 51 percent of registered voters,
down from 71 percent in the 2000 presidential elections.  Of course,
turnout in presidential election years typically exceeds that in
gubernatorial election years; however, the 2002 turnout of about half of
registered voters represents a considerable decline from the nearly 60
percent of voters who turned out in the 1998 gubernatorial race in
California.  In successive surveys that we have conducted since the 1998
election, the voters have sent a clear and consistent message:  They are
dissatisfied with their candidate choices, they are unhappy with the way
that campaigns are run, and they have become increasingly distrustful of
state government.
Although the 2003 recall was mostly about unhappiness with the
incumbent, Governor Gray Davis, it was fought against a backdrop of
widespread dissatisfaction with electoral politics that has been in
evidence for some time.  Moreover, our public opinion survey conducted
during the 2003 recall election indicated that voters remained unhappy
about the state of campaigns and elections with almost half of likely
voters saying that the experience of the recall election actually made them
feel worse about California politics (see PPIC Statewide Survey, October
2003).
It is important to note that Californians were not always so cynical
about their government and elected officials, so negative about the
campaigns and candidates, and so apparently disconnected from the
voting process as they are today.  If we turn back the clock to the 1960s,
for instance, nearly eight out of 10 registered California voters appeared
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at the polls during those election years.  With the state’s residents
apparently buying into the concept that government operated in an
efficient and an effective manner and could make their lives better, their
support for the large public investments that their leaders proposed (e.g.,
public universities, freeway systems, state aqueducts) was all but
guaranteed at the polls.  The citizens’ initiative process was rarely used in
this era to overrule government or to set the course for public policy.
But over the past 40 years, Californians’ faith in state government and
their elected officials has soured and their interest in participating in the
state’s elections has diminished (Baldassare, 2000).  In recent election
cycles leading up to and beyond the 2003 recall, the trends of voter
distrust and disinterest appear to have accelerated.
These negative changes in perceptions of state government, of the
campaigns of gubernatorial candidates, and of the election process itself
have occurred in the context of both dramatic increases in the costs of
political campaigning and heightened professionalism in campaigns.
Candidates have steadily increased their investments in state races over
the years in an effort to win over California’s expanding electorate, and
since the 1986 contest, the gubernatorial candidate who spent the most
won the race.
We hypothesize in this chapter that voter dissatisfaction with the
political process is related to the public’s dissatisfaction with the way
political campaigns are being run.  Increased spending on state
campaigns may have exacerbated this trend, as campaigns tend to focus
on the “dark side” of politicians.  Recent California elections have been
marked by a heavy reliance on relatively new forms of political
communication, particularly negative campaigning and television
advertising, and these efforts come under special scrutiny in our analysis.
Moreover, investment in these tactics has changed the nature of political
campaigning in California today, and such tactics may explain why so
many voters stay home on Election Day.
Population, Voting, and Public Opinion Surveys
In this analysis, we draw on such sources as the PPIC Statewide
Survey series and nonpartisan preelection surveys, media exit polls, and
government data on state elections.  We rely in particular on a special
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survey conducted in the week leading up to the November 2002
California statewide elections.  This preelection survey of 2,000 adult
residents was developed by PPIC survey staff, in conjunction with the
Center for Campaign Leadership (CCL) at the University of California,
Berkeley, and was funded by The Pew Charitable Trusts.
Our survey of Californians’ perceptions and attitudes in the closing
days of an election cycle attempted to measure both the level of
satisfaction with current campaigns, what Californians ideally wanted to
take place in their elections, and the kinds of campaigning that they
particularly did not appreciate.  The survey questions encompassed both
elections in general and, more specifically, the 2002 gubernatorial race.
Other public opinion data are drawn from the PPIC Statewide
Surveys, which have been conducted regularly since early 1998.  Other
time-series data before 1998 come largely from the Field Poll and the Los
Angeles Times Poll.  These survey sources have spent much of the last two
decades measuring public opinion on ballot issues but have sometimes
focused on broader political issues such as knowledge about candidates
and campaigns, thus providing data for our comparisons over time.
Finally, the California Secretary of State routinely provides
information on population and voting trends in California, as well as
detailed information about the nature of campaigns.  These data include
measures of candidate spending, voter turnout, and demographic
changes in the population in general as well as in the population of
eligible and registered voters.  These data provide an objective baseline
against which we can consider the public’s perceptions in surveys.
Voters’ Views on the 2002 Governor’s Election
To place voters’ views in perspective, it is important to note that the
2002 governor’s election reflected trends in evidence for the past 20 years
(Figure 2.1).  In general, spending on state elections has increased
dramatically, while the turnout of registered voters has steadily declined.
As we noted above, the trend is most evident in gubernatorial elections
rather than in presidential election years.  The 2002 governor’s race
offers the most dramatic example of these inverse trends.
It is important to note that spending on political campaigns is not
designed to increase overall voter turnout.  The purpose of campaign
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Figure 2.1—Gubernatorial Campaign Expenditures and Voter Turnout
in California, 1982–2002
spending is to win an election.  Many political consultants are thus
interested in designing campaigns that increase voter turnout for their
candidates and depress voter turnout for their opponents.  Moreover,
individual decisions about whether to vote tend to be related to personal
characteristics, such as education and length of residence at the same
address rather than typically being a decision to vote for a specific
candidate (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980).
But even statewide campaigns that devote money to getting out the
vote without reference to specific candidates or political parties, as in the
2002 election in California, may not motivate more voters to go to the
polls.  Indeed, turnout in November 2002 was at a historic low.  This is
noteworthy because it suggests that marketing and advertising are
ineffective in mobilizing voters when the public is unhappy with the
campaigns and their choice of candidates, as they apparently were in the
2002 governor’s race.
What did the PPIC Statewide Survey tell us about voters’ attitudes
toward this election?  First, only about four in 10 California adults said
that they were satisfied with the choice of candidates for governor (Table
2.1).  Notably, both registered voters and likely voters (i.e., voters with a
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Table 2.1
Californians’ Satisfaction with Candidate
Choices for Governor
% Satisfied with
Choices for Governor
All adults 42
Registered voters 41
Likely voters 37
SOURCE:  PPIC Statewide Survey (November
2002).
NOTE:  N = 2,000.
history of participating regularly in elections) were less likely than
residents overall to say that they were satisfied with the candidates.  For
instance, 42 percent of adults stated that they were satisfied with the
choice of candidates in the week before the election, but only 37 percent
of likely voters said so.  The unhappiness with candidates may explain
voters’ reluctance to go to the polls in 2002, despite the fact that many of
them had voted regularly in the past.
Similarly, when people were asked whether they felt that, in general,
elections in California had gotten better or worse in the last 10 years, a
significant proportion said that elections had gotten worse (Table 2.2).
Nearly four in 10 adults (37%) claimed that this was the case, or nearly
the same percentage that was dissatisfied with the current choice of
candidates.  Moreover, 42 percent of adults felt that election campaigns
in California were getting worse in terms of ethics and values.  It is also
noteworthy that only about one in 10 adults thought that campaigns in
California were getting better.  In addition, the most informed
residents—that is, those most likely to vote—were even more negative
about the quality of campaigns.  Nearly half (49%) of likely voters said
that elections in general had gotten worse in California, and over half
(54%) said that elections had gotten worse in terms of ethics and values.
Evidence of growing dissatisfaction with politics was apparent well
before the 2002 elections.  Large and increasing proportions of
Californians have reported that partisan politics and politicians were
problematic for the state (Table 2.3).  In 1983, seven in 10 respondents
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Table 2.2
Californians’ Perceptions of Election Trends
% Saying
Better
% Saying
Worse
% Saying
Same or
Don’t Know
California elections have gotten better,
worse, or stayed the same in the last 10
years. 13 37 50
California elections have gotten better,
worse, or stayed the same in terms of
ethics and values in the last 10 years. 12 42 56
SOURCE:  PPIC Statewide Survey (November 2002).
NOTE:  N = 2,000.
Table 2.3
Californians’ Attitudes Toward Politics and Politicians, 1983 and 1999
% Who
Agreed in
1983
% Who
Agreed in
1999
Politics today is too partisan; the political parties are
continually at odds to such an extent that government
and society suffer. 70 76
Politicians generally are self-serving and only looking
out for themselves. 34 41
SOURCE:  Field Poll (1999).
NOTE:  N = 1,005.
said that politics was too partisan and that the political partisanship was
damaging government and society.  In 1999, more than three in four
respondents (76%) agreed with this view.  Similarly, although only a
third of respondents in 1983 said that politicians are self-serving and
look out for themselves, over four in 10 Californians agreed with this
assessment in 1999.
Overall, the current results and recent trends paint a bleak picture of
California voters, who are expressing a general discontent with their
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state’s election process.  Voters’ unhappiness is reflected in both public
opinion and public action, as registered voters not only complain about
the political process but also choose not to participate in statewide
elections.  The sharp decline in voter turnout in November 2002, in
combination with the highly critical statements by residents about the
election then in progress, suggests that something has gone noticeably
wrong with elections in California.
Perceptions of Political Campaigns
Political campaigns play an important role in a democratic society.
They serve the dual purpose of informing voters about the candidates
and motivating voters to go to the polls to cast a ballot for that
candidate.  When candidates spend more money on their
campaigns—assuming that they do so effectively—they should become
more familiar to voters.  However, just because a campaign reminds
people of an impending election does not necessarily mean that voters
will turn out to vote.  Some voters may take in this campaign
information and then decide not to vote for anyone.
The 2002 California election is a good case on this latter point.  The
results of the survey we conducted in the week before the November
2002 election suggest that Californians did not lack exposure to the
messages of the candidates running for the governor’s office (Table 2.4).
Three in four people said that they had seen the candidates’ campaign
Table 2.4
Californians’ Perceptions of Advertising by Gubernatorial Candidates
% Who Saw an Ad by a
Candidate for Governor
in the Last Month
% Who Found Ads
Helpful in Making
a Voting Decisiona
All adults 75 33
Registered voters 78 30
Likely voters 80 26
SOURCE:  PPIC Statewide Survey (November 2002).
NOTE:  N = 2,000.
aIncludes respondents who saw ads by a candidate for governor.
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advertisements on television.  Moreover, eight in 10 of those who were
most likely to vote indicated that they had seen such advertisements.
Although Californians may have been exposed to campaign
advertising, the advertisements did not appear to provide them with the
information they wanted the most—information that would help them
decide how to vote.  Only one in three Californians (33%) thought that
the advertisements by the candidates were helpful in making a decision
about how to vote in the November election.
Even fewer among those who were most likely to vote in the
upcoming election—and who tend to be more politically
informed—found the campaign advertisements helpful.  Just one in four
likely voters said that the television advertisements run by the candidates
for governor helped in making a decision about how to vote.
Although voters may not receive all of their political information
from campaign advertisements, evidence from the 2002 election suggests
that there could be a link between the lack of useful information in the
political advertisements and voters’ indecision about the candidates in
this election.  Certainly, the evidence suggests that the quantity of
information is not a determining factor in the size of the undecided vote.
In a survey taken the month before the 2002 gubernatorial election, over
half of respondents said that they were paying close attention to the
campaign, yet nearly one in four said that they did not yet know how
they would vote (Table 2.5).  Moreover, in our survey conducted during
the week before Election Day, nearly six in 10 Californians said that they
were paying close attention to the campaign.  However, despite this
attention, nearly one in four voters were still unsure of how they would
vote in the election.  On Election Day itself, a Los Angeles Times exit poll
reported that 20 percent of those leaving the polls had made a decision
about how they would vote on the day of the election itself.  Many
others who are not reflected in exit polls apparently decided not to vote
at all.
By way of contrast, in a PPIC Statewide Survey taken the month
before the November 1998 gubernatorial election, fewer than half of the
respondents in that survey said that they were paying close attention to
the race for governor.  But less than 10 percent of Californians said that
they did not know how they would vote for governor in the November
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Table 2.5
Californians’ Attention to Campaigns and Voting Uncertainty
% Who Reported
Paying Close Attention
to the Campaign
% Who Reported Not
Knowing How They
Would Vote for Governor
October 1998a 47 9
October 2002b 53 24
November 2002c 59 23
SOURCES:  PPIC Statewide Survey (October 1998, October 2002,
November 2002).
aN = 2,005.
bN = 2,007.
cN = 2,000.
1998 election.  Despite the fact that fewer people were following the last
gubernatorial election than the 2002 election, fewer people were
undecided in 1998 than in the more recent matchup.
Complaints about campaign advertising are not new to politics, but
our findings are noteworthy because they reflect a relationship between
increased political information and increased voting indecision.  Some
campaign advertising, rather than providing potential voters with
information that leads to ballot choices, may instead provide them with
information about candidates that may lead to difficulty in choosing a
candidate that appeals to them.  For some, the decision may be to not
vote, given the candidate information that is provided.  In sum, low
turnout in the 2002 California gubernatorial election cannot be
explained by lack of public exposure to the candidates’ campaigns or lack
of knowledge about the upcoming elections.  Rather, low turnout may
reflect a response to the information about the candidates that was
provided during the governor’s race.
Low Turnout and More Initiatives:  Confirming
Evidence of Campaign Dissatisfaction
The public’s pessimism about California politics has been increasing
steadily over the last several years.  We argue that this growing
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dissatisfaction has led to declining voter participation at the polls on
Election Day.  Another change in California elections—an increasing
reliance on the citizens’ initiative process to make state laws—offers
further support for the hypothesis that voters’ disaffection with
politicians has increased.
The 2002 gubernatorial race between Gray Davis and Bill Simon
was noteworthy for its high level of campaign expenses and the negative
tone set by both candidates.  In the final election, Davis defeated Simon,
but he won with only 47 percent of the vote and despite the fact that 1.7
million fewer people voted for him in 2002 than had voted for him in
1998.  Simon’s campaign failed to attract potential voters to the polls as
well.
In the meantime, voters have been increasingly exposed to and
enthusiastic about their ability to participate in the “direct democracy”
process afforded them by the state constitution—the recall, the
referendum, and the citizens’ initiative.  In our PPIC Statewide Surveys
over the past few years, voters have consistently expressed a high level of
satisfaction with the initiative process.  Moreover, many voters say that
they would prefer that voters make the important decisions for the state
through ballot measures  (Baldassare, 2002).
California state politics and policymaking today rely to a large extent
on the initiative process, which allows groups outside state government
to make public policy by placing potential laws and constitutional
amendments directly on the state ballot for voters to enact or reject.
State initiatives may cover a range of topics, from cigarette taxes to
restrictions on the sale of horsemeat.  However, the initiative process has
recently shifted its focus, with an increasing number of statewide
initiatives attempting to impose external controls on state government
itself (Table 2.6).  These initiatives include proposals to impose term
limits, to change the primary system, to identify or punish incumbents
for certain behaviors, and to restrict campaign fund-raising and
expenditures.  In the early 1980s, these kinds of initiatives were rarely
proposed and even more rarely qualified for the ballot.  In the early to
mid-1990s, however, the number of initiatives with this focus, both
proposed and qualified, increased dramatically (see Baldassare, 2000,
2002; Schrag, 1998).
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Table 2.6
Citizens’ Campaign Reform Initiatives in California,
1980–2002
Year
Proposed for
the Ballot
Qualified for
the Ballot
Total Number
of Initiatives
Qualified for
the Ballot
1980 0 0 3
1982 1 0 6
1984 2 1 12
1986 1 1 7
1988 2 0 16
1990 5 1 18
1992 4 1 4
1994 7 0 6
1996 3 3 16
1998 6 2 13
2000 7 2 15
2002 3 1 7
SOURCES:  California Attorney General (2002); Silva
(2000); University of California Hastings College of Law
(2002).
NOTES:  The total number of initiatives proposed and
qualified includes only those proposed by citizens and not
those proposed by the legislature.  Initiatives counted as related
to campaign reform include proposals that attempted to place
external controls on government—specifically, campaign
finance reform, term limits, campaign advertising disclosure,
changes in primary laws, conditioning reelection on balancing
the budget, designation of incumbents on the ballot, changes
in registration laws, and creating a “none of the above” ballot
option.
During the 1996 election cycle, an unprecedented three initiatives
designed to control legislative behavior appeared on the ballot—one on
term limits and two on campaign contribution limits.  No more than
one similar initiative had appeared on the ballot in any prior election
cycle.  Since that time, there has been no election cycle where at least one
of these kinds did not appear on the ballot.  Even larger numbers of
related initiatives were proposed but failed to qualify for the statewide
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ballot, with the number of proposals increasing sharply during the 1990
election cycle.  Since that time, the number of proposed initiatives that
attempt to control the behavior of state government has never dropped
to the levels of the 1980s.
When citizens feel connected to government and in control of
government activities, there is little need or desire to impose political
controls beyond the normal process of representative democracy—voting
candidates in and out of office.  However, as people become increasingly
disconnected from government and their elected officials, the desire to
use the tools of direct democracy to impose structural constraints on the
executive branch and legislatures grows.  The increasing efforts to impose
these external constraints over the past decade reflect the feeling that
government pays limited attention to the desires of constituents.
In the week before the 2002 election, when Californians were asked
whether they felt that having elections made government pay attention
to what people think, over seven in 10 respondents (71%) said that they
felt the elections made government pay either a great deal (31%) or a fair
amount (40%) of attention to what people think.  But people who were
asked how much attention government actually pays to what people
think were much less positive about the influence of their views.  Over
half (53%) said that they felt that government paid not too much
attention, or no attention at all, to what people think.  The increasing
numbers of initiatives designed to impose restrictions on the activities of
government, both in office and during campaigns, are consistent with
this belief that government is inattentive to the public.
What Happens When Candidates Focus on Negative
Campaigning?
Much of the dissatisfaction that Californians say they feel with
political campaigns today is derived from their dislike of a particular type
of campaign activity—referred to by political experts as “negative
campaigning.”  Although people recognize that campaigns involve
candidates criticizing their opponents as well as advocating their own
election, in the most recent election they felt that this criticism had
reached unsupportable levels.
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Our PPIC Statewide Survey in November 2002 asked half of
respondents whether they felt that political candidates should be critical
of their opponents and the other half of respondents whether they felt
that Gray Davis and Bill Simon, the major party candidates for governor,
should be critical of each other (Table 2.7).  Respondents who were
asked the more general question were split evenly (47% each) between
agreeing that criticism was important to learn the strengths and
weaknesses of each candidate and disagreeing because campaigns are
already too negative.  In contrast, a large majority (58%) of those who
were asked whether Gray Davis and Bill Simon should be critical of each
other said that they should not be, because campaigns are too negative.
It is interesting to note that only slightly more than a third of the survey
respondents (36%) thought that Davis and Simon should be critical of
each other.
Candidates may be able to criticize each other without engaging in
what is perceived to be negative campaigning.  But the 2002
gubernatorial candidates failed to draw the line between criticism and
negativity as each sought instead to destroy the credibility of his
opponent.  Earlier campaigns have not always suffered from the same
problem.  In a 1996 poll of state voters, 49 percent of respondents said
that the Clinton-Dole campaign was “not too negative,” and 46 percent
said that it was either somewhat or very negative (Field Poll, 1996).
Table 2.7
Californians’ Perceptions of Negative Campaigning
Yes, It Is Important to
Know the Strengths
and Weaknesses of
Each Candidate
No, Campaigns
Are Too Negative
Should political candidates be critical of
their opponents? 47% 47%
Should Gray Davis and Bill Simon be
critical of each other? 36% 58%
SOURCE:  PPIC Statewide Survey (November 2002).
NOTE:  N = 2,000.
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These results are consistent with general feelings about whether political
candidates should be critical of their opponents, suggesting that feelings
about the 1996 campaign simply reflected underlying assessments about
the value of candidates criticizing each other rather than a distinctive
feature of that particular campaign.  The same could not be said about
the 2002 gubernatorial race.
Measuring the Influence of Attack Advertising:
Results of a Survey Experiment
Campaign consultants argue that negative campaigning is often
necessary.  They claim that voters view the candidates who are attacked
more negatively, allowing the attacking candidates to increase their
chances of winning.  It is generally perceived to be necessary as a way to
salvage the reputations of candidates who have already been attacked by
their opponents.  However, very little effort has been made to measure
how these attacks affect people’s perception of both the attacking
candidates and those who are attacked.  The PPIC Statewide Survey in
November 2002 attempted to test constituent responses to attack ads by
asking respondents to rate their feelings about candidates after hearing
that they had either run attack ads or responded to attack ads.  The
examples used in the survey were based on the actual accusations and
actual responses of both Davis and Simon during the 2002 gubernatorial
campaign.
Each respondent was randomly assigned to hear about a different
kind of attack ad, and each could have been asked about his or her
perceptions of either the attacking candidate after hearing the ad, or the
attacked candidate after hearing the ad, but not about both.  Both Davis
and Simon attack advertisements were used as examples.  This series of
survey questions made it possible to measure the effect of running attack
advertisements on a candidate’s popularity and to measure the
effectiveness of different possible responses to attack advertisements.
The candidate who was attacked could claim that the attacker was
mudslinging, could make a counterclaim, or could deny the charges.  At
various points in the 2002 gubernatorial campaign, the candidates did all
of these things.  As a final follow-up question, respondents were asked
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how they would have felt about the attacking candidate had he chosen
not to run the attack ad, or the attacked candidate had he chosen not to
respond to the attack ad.  For instance, respondents were asked one of
the following questions:
Option 1:  In this campaign, a Gray Davis advertisement claimed
that Bill Simon had engaged in fraudulent business dealings, and in
response Simon said that Davis was engaging in mudslinging and negative
campaigning.  Did this exchange make you feel more positive or more
negative about Bill Simon?
Option 2:  In this campaign, a Gray Davis advertisement claimed
that Bill Simon had engaged in fraudulent business dealings, and in
response Simon said that Davis was engaging in mudslinging and negative
campaigning.  Did this exchange make you feel more positive or more
negative about Gray Davis?
Option 3:  In this campaign, a Gray Davis advertisement claimed
that Bill Simon had engaged in fraudulent business dealings, and in
response Simon said that Davis is a “toll-booth” governor who makes policy
only in exchange for campaign contributions.  Did this exchange make you
feel more positive or more negative about Bill Simon?
Option 4:  In this campaign, a Gray Davis advertisement claimed
that Bill Simon had engaged in fraudulent business dealings, and in
response Simon said that Davis is a “toll-booth” governor who makes policy
only in exchange for campaign contributions.  Did this exchange make you
feel more positive or more negative about Gray Davis?
Option 5:  In this campaign, a Gray Davis advertisement claimed
that Bill Simon had engaged in fraudulent business dealings, and in
response Simon denied that he was guilty of any wrongdoing.  Did this
exchange make you feel more positive or more negative about Bill
Simon?
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Option 6:  In this campaign, a Gray Davis advertisement claimed
that Bill Simon had engaged in fraudulent business dealings, and in
response Simon denied that he was guilty of any wrongdoing.  Did this
exchange make you feel more positive or more negative about Gray
Davis?
After being asked one of these questions, respondents were asked
how a different strategy would have affected their opinions of the
candidates:
Option A:  If Bill Simon had ignored Davis’s commercial instead of
responding, would this have made you feel more positive or more
negative about Bill Simon?
Option B:  If Davis had not made this claim about Simon, would
this have made you feel more positive or more negative about Gray
Davis?
Surprisingly, all of the potential responses to attack advertisements
were equally unpopular, including denying that the attack was true.  The
only response that was correlated with more positive rankings of the
candidates was not making the attack or ignoring the attack.  On
average, 45 to 50 percent of respondents said that they perceived a
candidate who attacked the other candidate, or who responded to the
attack, more negatively.  At the same time, 25 to 35 percent of the
respondents said that it would make no difference to them.  In contrast,
approximately four in 10 respondents said they would have felt more
positively about either candidate had they not attacked the other or had
they ignored attack ads directed at them.  Another 30 to 40 percent of
respondents said it would make no difference, but this may reflect the
fact that it was difficult to perceive a campaign without attack
advertisements at this late stage in the campaign.
It is important to note that both Davis and Simon were already
perceived very negatively in the week before the election.  Only 46
percent of respondents said that they viewed Davis favorably, and only
39 percent viewed Simon favorably, and any increase in favorable
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opinion for either of these candidates would be noteworthy and
significant in the final moments of the election.
It may not matter to candidates whether their approval ratings
decrease when they run attack ads, as long as the potential voters who
disapprove are not already their supporters.  If those watching the ads
will not vote for the attacking candidate anyway, the cost to the
campaign of alienating them is minimal.  However, when we split the
survey into respondents who already supported Davis, and respondents
who already supported Simon, it was apparent that negative advertising
was affecting the opinions of supporters as well as opponents (Table 2.8).
Between 33 and 39 percent of Davis supporters viewed Davis more
negatively for attacking Simon and for responding to Simon’s attacks.
Between 35 and 39 percent of Simon supporters viewed Simon more
negatively when he attacked Davis or responded to Davis’s attacks.
Moreover, the nonsupporters of each candidate and those who did not
Table 2.8
Perceptions of Negative Campaigning by Supporters and Nonsupporters
He is
perceived . . .
By
Nonsupporters
By
Supporters Neither
Negative campaigning
When Davis attacks More negatively 71% 33% 48%
When Davis responds More negatively 72% 39% 50%
When Simon attacks More negatively 58% 39% 40%
When Simon responds More negatively 66% 35% 41%
Avoid negative campaigning
When Davis does not attack More positively 37% 47% 35%
When Davis does not respond More positively 35% 51% 25%
When Simon does not attack More positively 36% 45% 32%
When Simon does not respond More positively 37% 47% 42%
SOURCE:  PPIC Statewide Survey (November 2002).
NOTES:  Respondents were asked randomized questions about how they would
perceive candidates after viewing Davis and Simon advertisements with a range of
characteristics.  N = 2,000.
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support either candidate were even more likely to perceive the candidates
negatively for attacking and for responding to attacks.
In contrast, even nonsupporters said that they would view Davis and
Simon more positively had they chosen not to attack or not to respond
to attacks.  Between 35 and 37 percent of those who did not support
Davis said that they would have viewed him more favorably if he had
avoided negative campaigning.  A similar percentage of those who did
not support Simon said that they would have viewed Simon more
favorably if he had avoided negative campaigning.  In the 2002
campaign, however, neither candidate managed to profit from this
potential goodwill, because both chose to run negative campaigns
throughout the course of the governor’s race.
The effect of attack ads on supporters indicates the political risks of
running negative advertising.  Many campaign consultants argue that
supporters are not affected by attack ads and will not change their votes
even if they dislike the tone of the campaign.  But if even supporters are
unhappy with candidates who engage in negative campaigning, the
ability of negative advertisements to decrease the popularity of the
candidate who has been attacked must be viewed against their ability to
decrease the popularity of the attacker.
In the 2002 gubernatorial race, both candidates concentrated their
resources on attacking each other.  Although voters were not able to
effectively switch to a candidate who campaigned positively, they were
able to skip voting altogether.  In many cases, they did exactly that.  One
lesson learned from this survey experiment is that the winning candidate
who spent more in this election—Gray Davis—took on risks in the
amount of time and resources that were dedicated to attack ads.  The
strategy may have ensured his narrow victory.  However, it came at the
expense of a shrinking support base that made Davis vulnerable after the
2002 election.  For one thing, a low turnout reduced the threshold for
the number of signatures needed to qualify for a recall.  Moreover, even
some Democratic voters stayed at home or voted to remove Davis from
office in 2003.
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Correlates of Voter Dissatisfaction with Candidate
Choices
The public’s perceptions of the 2002 gubernatorial election were
noteworthy in part because the people who were most alienated were the
most knowledgeable about the political process that was taking place.
We attempted to measure the factors that were related to expressions of
dissatisfaction with the choice of candidates for governor.  We
considered a number of potential correlates of dissatisfaction such as
attention to the campaign, interest in politics, several demographic
variables, and such political factors as strong party identification.
The results from a logit regression show that dissatisfaction increased
significantly with level of attention to the campaign and with the level of
interest in politics (see Appendix A).  In general, increased political
information is supposed to make potential voters more confident about
their choices, just as providing more information through campaigns
should increase voter confidence in the candidates and voter turnout on
Election Day.  However, the factors that seemed to make Californians
unhappy with the 2002 gubernatorial race appeared to affect even the
most informed and interested people.  California campaigns appear to
have descended to a level of communication that even active voters can
no longer tolerate.
Information on Election Campaigns
Potential voters said that they did not receive the type of information
that they needed to make a decision in the most recent California
election.  However, the information that they find most useful does not
seem that difficult to ascertain.  In all of the preelection surveys that we
have conducted since 1998, Californians have said that, above all else,
they would most like to know about candidates’ stands on the issues.  In
our survey just before the election, Californians chose learning about
candidates’ stands on the issues as the most important thing that they
could learn in a campaign, rather than information about candidates’
character, political parties, or past experience in office.  Notably,
however, this demand for information about issues was not met in the
2002 campaign.  Although 69 percent of our survey respondents said
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that they would like most to hear about the candidates’ stands on the
issues, fewer than one-third were satisfied with the discussion of issues in
the 2002 campaign (Table 2.9).  In all of our preelection surveys,
relatively few Californians said that they were satisfied with the
discussion of issues during the campaign.
The picture that emerges from the 2002 campaign is one of
extensive voter frustration with the content of communication, which
made voters less eager to support any of the candidates.  Despite paying
more attention to campaigns than in the past, a large share of
Californians said that they failed to receive the information that they
needed to choose a candidate for governor.  Nearly half of registered
voters and more than half of eligible voters were no-shows at the polls.
On top of frustration with the content of the campaign, however, is
frustration with the means that candidates used to deliver campaign
messages.  When asked how they prefer to learn about candidates, voters
chose debates more than any other means of communication (Table
2.10).  However, in the 2002 campaign, there was only one debate
between the candidates for governor.  Making the debate even less
relevant, it was scheduled at noon on a Monday, when a large percentage
of the working population was unable to watch it.  How do Californians
feel about the status quo of campaign communications today?  Over four
in 10 Californians said that they would view candidates who primarily
used television advertising to get their message out to voters less
favorably; another 20 percent said it would make no difference to them.
Table 2.9
Californians’ Preferences and Satisfaction on Attention to the Issues
Preference Percentage
Would most like to know candidates’ stands on issuesa 69
Satisfied with discussion of the issues in the campaignb 30
SOURCES:  PPIC Statewide Survey (November 2002, October 2002).
aN = 2,000.
bN = 2,007.
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Table 2.10
Californians’ Preferred Means of Candidate
Communication
Means of Communication Percentage
Debates 34
TV call-in shows 16
Speeches 16
Town hall meetings 15
Mailers 8
Door-to-door 3
SOURCE:  PPIC Statewide Survey (November
2002).
NOTE:  N = 2,000.
Californians’ feelings about the information provided by a largely
ad-driven campaign were quite negative.  In particular, when asked about
their impressions of political campaigns in general, as well as the 2002
gubernatorial campaign in particular, an overwhelming number of
respondents volunteered that the biggest problem with campaigns in
general, and with the 2002 campaign specifically, was the emphasis on
negative advertising.  And by nearly any measure, the tone of the recent
California gubernatorial campaign was overwhelmingly negative.
It is important to note here that paid advertising is obviously not the
only source of information on elections.  The media play an important
role in providing information on candidates and election events.  We
know from our current study that many residents closely followed the
news stories about the 2002 governor’s election, but it is unclear if the
attack ads had an influence on the types of election stories that the media
covered.  Nor is it clear if the dissatisfaction with the tone and substance
of this campaign that was elicited in our surveys can be at least partly
attributed to the media coverage of the attack ads and negative
campaigning.  Future studies should focus on the combined effects of the
media stories and campaign information on dissatisfaction with
campaigns and elections in California.
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Conclusions
The dissatisfaction that Californians felt with the most recent
gubernatorial election is historically noteworthy and politically
significant.  Moreover, it appears to have extended beyond simple
protestations of unhappiness.  Lacking the information that they felt they
needed to make a decision, and unhappy with the candidate choices and
the means by which campaign messages were communicated, an
unprecedented number of voters chose not to appear at the polls at all.
However, it should be noted that the 2002 election is typical and not an
aberration.  The findings reported here are symptomatic of trends we
found both before and after the Davis-Simon race—and are ever-present
in the wake of the governor’s recall in the fall of 2003.
The failure of political campaigns to satisfy the demands of potential
voters has implications for the democratic system.  Part of the purpose of
any political campaign is to bring politicians seeking elected office in
touch with constituents and to serve as a mandate for continuance of
past policies or the creation of new ones.  One expectation placed on
candidates is that they will provide information that will allow voters to
make those decisions, either directly through their own campaigns or
indirectly by criticizing their opponents.
The competition inherent in a campaign is designed to allow voters
to hear at least two platforms, one of which will direct the politician who
is elected.  However, when both sides of a campaign provide information
that voters find only irrelevant or off-putting, constituents have few
options for protest other than withholding their votes.
We find that candidates hurt their own images by campaigning
negatively and providing inadequate information to voters.  Equally
important, attack campaigns, even beyond their effects on turnout, harm
democratic legitimacy.  Are feelings about campaigns correlated with
trust in government and, specifically, does unhappiness with campaigns
lead to decreased trust?
Although the effects of lowered trust in government may be difficult
to pin down, a government that does not enjoy the support of its
constituents may have difficulty enacting policy, and may face increasing
external controls such as term limits.  In the case of California, there has
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been an increasing trend for voters to circumvent the legislative process
altogether through the citizens’ initiative process.  Dissatisfaction with
the recent gubernatorial election appears to have generated a new effort
to impose external controls on officeholders, with the first successful
movement in California to recall a sitting governor.  We look for further
evidence of a direct link between perceptions of political campaigns and
feelings of political distrust in the next chapter.
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3. Political Campaigns and Voter
Distrust
Political observers have long suspected that trends in campaign
practices such as negative advertising might lower the public’s capacity
for political trust.  In the California context, the voters’ dissatisfaction
with political campaigns that we noted in the previous chapter has
mounted against a backdrop of declining trust in government.  The
assumption underlying many campaign reforms, ranging from campaign
finance regulation to pledges of clean conduct, is that they will serve to
regenerate trust in government.  To date, however, there is no evidence
that any political or election reforms that have been enacted have actually
increased the level of political trust.
The question that we address here is whether trust in government
increases when candidates engage in more desirable campaign behavior
and decreases when they engage in less desirable campaign
behavior—that is, political practices that stray widely from public ideals
or expectations about appropriate behavior for candidates for elected
office.
There are several reasons to study the link between political
campaign practices and political distrust.  First, given the frequency of
election campaigns in recent years, there are many different types of
campaigns to observe, and there is no shortage of cases that are negative
in their tone and tactics.  An analysis of political campaign trends thus
offers a potential explanation for increasing levels of distrust in
government.  Next, a consideration of the effects of negative campaigns
on political trust offers the opportunity to review whether some of the
more practical claims about the consequences of a decline in political
trust are valid.  For example, are constituents who trust government less
really more likely to limit legislative activities and oppose an expansion of
government’s role?  A range of potential consequences of low trust in
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government has been discussed, but there is little known on whether and
how much distrust in government has real policy and political
implications (see Baldassare, 2002; Citrin, 1974; Miller, 1974; Moore,
2002).
The decreasing trust in government inspired by negative campaigns
and voter dissatisfaction with the election process have larger
implications for the prospect of governance in California.  Specifically,
low trust in government may decrease democratic legitimacy and thus
make it increasingly difficult to enact effective public policy.  It may also
encourage voters to make state laws on their own through the initiative
process.
The role of political distrust during the 2002 gubernatorial election
in California is worthy of our careful attention.  This election was a
political event that received national attention for its record-setting
spending on a campaign that was uniformly described as overwhelmingly
negative and that generated critical comments about both major party
candidates.  In the final analysis, the record low voter turnout raises
questions about the role of political distrust.  Indeed, trust in the state
and federal government was relatively low during the 2002 election.
Moreover, trust in the state government declined further in the months
after November 2002 leading up to the October 2003 recall election
and, as of this writing, has yet to recover to the pre–November 2002
levels.  These trends raise another issue—whether and how much trust is
regained once it is lost.
The Reasons for Public Distrust
Trust in government depends on a variety of factors that can be
loosely organized into three general categories:  (1) assessments of current
political leadership and the political system; (2) individual characteristics;
and (3) levels of political engagement.
Past research has raised questions about whether assessments of
political leaders influence political trust in a significant way.  Initial
research on political trust found that individual characteristics, such as a
person’s age and level of education, were the main determinants of trust.
However, further research on perceptions of trust in government
suggested that trust varies over time in response to political conditions.
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After the Watergate scandal, Citrin (1974) argued that levels of political
trust were correlated with feelings about political leaders, especially at the
presidential level (see also Baldassare, 2002; Dionne, 1991; Lipset and
Schneider, 1983; Pew Research Center for the People and the Press,
1998).  Specifically, those who disapprove of political incumbents are
less trusting than those who approve of incumbents.
Researchers have found that individuals may base their trust in
government at least partially on their assessments of features of the
political system, such as campaigns and elections (Buchanan, 1996,
2000; Rahn, Brehm, and Carlson, 1999; Simon, 2003; Williams 1985).
What does the experience of an actual election do to one’s level of
political trust? Some research suggests that certain campaigns can
increase political trust (Bartels, 2000; Bartels et al., 2000; Buchanan,
2000; Clark and Acock, 1989; Ginsberg and Weissberg, 1978; Rahn,
Brehm, and Carlson, 1999).  And equally, there is speculation that
unattractive campaigns—specifically those that are negative or
vacuous—depress trust in government (Buchanan, 1996; Simon, 2003).
Some evidence even suggests that distasteful political campaigns lead the
electorate to participate less frequently in politics (Ansolabehere and
Iyengar, 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).  Certain campaign
reforms, such as campaign finance reform, may thus increase political
trust.  In general, then, different elements of campaign and election
experiences appear to be significantly related to political trust.
As we have noted above, political trust varies with individual
characteristics, either alone (Miller, 1974) or in conjunction with
assessments of political leaders (Citrin and Green, 1986).  Underlying
political beliefs, sometimes related to social and economic characteristics,
also influence individual perceptions about government.  Some people
may have learning experiences that lead to trust in government, leading
to generational differences in trust that are traditionally measured by age
(Hetherington, 1998; Miller and Shanks, 1996).  Individuals may also
feel more trusting because of their ideological or partisan agreement with
political leadership (Hetherington, 1998).  Finally, researchers have
found that demographic characteristics such as race and ethnicity,
education, income, and gender are correlated with different levels of trust
in government (Hetherington, 1998).  Latinos are more trusting than
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those from other racial and ethnic backgrounds (Cohen, Baldassare, and
Kaimowitz-Rodriguez, 2003), whereas those with more education may
be more (Hetherington, 1998) or less (Finkel, 1985) trusting.  In
keeping with the assumption that those in agreement with, or profiting
from, current economic and political conditions are more trusting, those
with higher incomes are typically more trusting in government.
Finally, some evidence suggests that individual levels of political
engagement are correlated with political trust.  Most of this research
argues that exposure to politics and government will increase trust
(Hetherington, 1998), although some researchers argue that the effect is
reversed, and those who know more about government are less trusting
(Bowler and Donovan, 2002).  In addition, higher levels of political
participation, such as voting or attending political meetings, have been
correlated with higher levels of political trust (Finkel, 1985), particularly
among respondents with less education.
In our study, it is noteworthy that some of the assessments of trust in
government were measured in the context of a heated political
campaign—that is, the 2002 gubernatorial election in California.  But it
is important to note that this was also a time of highly negative
perceptions about the state’s economy and fiscal conditions.  At the same
time, California and the rest of the nation were a year out from the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York City and
Washington—an event that was initially followed by higher levels of
reported trust in the federal government and a significant spike in
presidential approval ratings.  For a variety of political and economic
reasons, then, despite the fact that people typically trust their state
government more than they trust the federal government (Bowler and
Donovan, 2002), by the fall of 2002, at the time of the gubernatorial
election campaign, Californians’ trust in state government had dropped
to levels below their trust in federal government.
Survey Evidence on Distrust in Government
In this section, we analyze the results of the PPIC Statewide Survey
that was conducted in the week before the November 2002 California
gubernatorial election.  This random-digit-dial telephone survey of 2,000
California adults interviewed in English or Spanish included subgroups
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of 1,526 respondents who claimed to be registered voters and 1,025 who
were deemed through their responses to be likely voters in state elections.
Along with a series of questions designed to measure perceptions of
candidates and campaigns (discussed in Chapter 2), all of the
respondents were asked about their level of trust in state and federal
government, their interest in politics, and their level of political
engagement.  These particular survey questions are the focus of the
analysis in this section.
The survey asked two specific trust questions.  The first referred to
trust in federal government, using the standard American National
Election Studies format noted below.  The form of the trust in state
government question was similar to that of the trust in federal
government question, but it referred to the government in Sacramento
rather than the government in Washington.  Responses indicating trust
or lack of trust were coded the same as the responses to the trust in
federal government question.
Federal government: “How much of the time do you trust the
government in Washington to do what is right?  Always, most of the
time, or only some of the time?”
State government: “How much of the time do you trust the
government in Sacramento to do what is right?  Always, most of the
time, or only some of the time?”
In the analysis below, those who said that they trusted government all
of the time or most of the time were considered to be trusting, and those
who said that they trusted government only some of the time, none of the
time, or they did not know were considered not to trust government.
Although a fourth category, “none of the time,” was not provided to
respondents, it is included in the response categories because people asked
about their trust in government in recent years frequently volunteered
this answer.  In the current survey, 5 percent volunteered “none of the
time” for the federal government, and 4 percent volunteered “none of the
time” for the state government.  Only 1 percent said that they had no
opinion about the state or federal governments.
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The PPIC Statewide Survey has been asking about trust in federal
government nearly every year since the survey’s inception in 1998.  The
trust in state government question, however, has had a shorter though
more intense recent history.  The trust in state government question was
first introduced into a PPIC Statewide Survey in January 2001 as part of
a survey series following the 2000 presidential election.  The first
instance of this question preceded the California energy crisis, which
would be expected to decrease trust in state government, as well as the
September 2001 terrorist attacks, which tended to increase trust in all
levels of government, at least temporarily.  In the past two years,
questions about trust in both the state and federal government have been
asked every few months.
Two questions were used to consider respondents’ political
assessments.  The first asked how favorably respondents perceived the
Democratic incumbent governor, Gray Davis, who was running for a
second term of office against Republican challenger, Bill Simon, using
the following answer categories:  Very favorable, somewhat favorable,
somewhat unfavorable, very unfavorable, and no opinion.  A second set
of questions asked whether political campaigns in California had been
getting better or worse in recent years, with the following wording asked
of a random half-sample of the 2,000 adults:
“More generally, overall do you think that election campaigns in
California have gotten better in the last 10 years, gotten worse, or stayed
about the same?”
“More generally, overall in terms of   ethics and values  , do you think
that election campaigns in California have gotten better in the last 10
years, gotten worse, or stayed about the same?”
These questions were recoded into two response categories for the
purposes of the analysis that follows in this chapter.  We contrast those
with a favorable view of Davis (i.e., very favorable or somewhat favorable
combined) against all other answers (i.e., somewhat unfavorable, very
unfavorable, no opinion).  The perception that political campaigns in
California were getting worse was contrasted against all other answers
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(i.e., getting better, staying the same, do not know).  As for the two
versions of the campaign quality question (i.e., overall and in terms of
ethics and values), because the results were similar using the different
wording, we combined the responses for our analysis into one question
that measures the perceptions of campaign quality in the past 10 years.
Our measures of individual characteristics—including age, sex, race,
income, education, and party identification—were thus taken from a
range of questions on demographic and political characteristics.  Other
questions in our analysis measured political engagement.  These included
questions about whether respondents had engaged in any of a series of
political activities, whether they had seen advertisements by the
candidates for governor, how much attention they paid to politics, and
how much attention they paid to news about the upcoming election.
Finally, respondents were asked whether they could correctly identify the
position of three political figures—U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein,
Secretary of State Colin Powell, and the Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom, Tony Blair.  These questions were designed to measure the
respondents’ levels of political knowledge and attentiveness to politics.
The questions on political activities were derived from the Roper
organization’s series on political participation.  Specifically, we asked
whether the respondents had, in the last six months, written to a political
representative, attended a political rally, attended a meeting on political
affairs, signed a petition, worked for a political party, given money to a
political party or candidate, or been a member of a political organization.
These measures were summed to an eight-point scale ranging from zero
activities to all seven activities.  Measures of attention paid to politics and
attention paid to the news spanned a four-point range from little or no
interest to a great deal or a fair amount of interest.  Finally, the measure
of political knowledge ranged from zero (none of the three political
figures correctly identified) to three (all three correctly identified).
The preelection survey questions made it possible to test expectations
for the three general hypotheses that attempt to explain what factors
affect trust in government.
1. Political assessments: Trust in state government is positively
correlated with support for the incumbent governor, Gray Davis.  Trust
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in state government is negatively correlated with feelings that election
campaigns are getting worse.
2. Individual characteristics: Trust in state government is negatively
correlated with being a strong Republican or an Independent and is
positively correlated with identification as a strong Democrat.  Both
women and Latinos are more trusting of state government, whereas
younger residents are less trusting of state government.
3. Political engagement: Residents who pay attention to the news,
who have a greater interest in politics, or who know more about politics
are more trusting of state government. Those who have seen the paid
political advertisements by the candidates for governor, Gray Davis or
Bill Simon, are less trusting of state government.
Trends in Distrust in State Government
Californians’ trust in state government declined during the 2002
election campaign and has not returned to previous levels as of this
writing.  The evidence from the PPIC Statewide Survey in November
2002, as well as past studies of trust in government in California,
suggests that campaign perceptions are related to attitudes toward
government.  Specifically, negative assessments of election campaigns are
correlated with lower levels of trust in government.  Moreover, political
assessments of incumbents and campaigns appear to provide stronger
correlations with declining trust than either individual characteristics or
political engagement according to our statistical analysis below.
Californians’ trust in state government has been declining over the
past three years, whereas trust in the federal government has remained
relatively stable.  This distinction between state and federal trust suggests
that although our survey questions asking about trust in these two levels
of government are similar, they are effectively measuring two different
phenomena rather than an underlying level of trust in all levels of
government.  In addition, it suggests that some phenomena specific to
California may have recently changed the levels of trust in state
government.  It is possible that the 2002 election was one of the major
factors contributing to this decline.
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Trust in the federal government expressed by California residents has
increased since the first PPIC Statewide Survey in April 1998.  In the
spring of 1998, only about one-quarter of Californians said that they
trusted the federal government always or most of the time (as shown in
Table 3.1).  By September 1998, trust in the federal government had
increased to approximately one-third of all respondents and remained at
or near that level through the end of 2000.  In January 2002, after the
September 11th terrorist attacks, the percentage of those saying that they
trusted the federal government leaped to 46 percent of all respondents.
Although trust in the federal government declined from this high several
months later, it still remained at a higher level than in the past.  By
August 2002, during the 2002 election campaign, almost four in 10
respondents said that they trusted the federal government (37%), and
trust remained at this level both during and after the state elections.
Californians’ trust in the federal government has shown a slow but steady
Table 3.1
Californians’ Trust in the Federal Government,
1998–2004
Date
% Who Trust Federal
Government Always or
Most of the Time
April 1998 26
May 1998 24
September 1998 33
December 1999 32
January 2000 33
October 2000 33
January 2002 46
August 2002 37
November 2002 37
February 2003 37
February 2004 30
SOURCES:  PPIC Statewide Surveys (1998–2004).
NOTE:  N = approximately 2,000 per survey wave.
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increase over the past five years and into 2003, but it declined recently in
February 2004.
In contrast, trust in state government has been moving in the
opposite direction (Table 3.2).  For the years measured, state
government trust was at its peak in 2001 and early 2002, with nearly half
of all respondents saying that they trusted state government (47%).
Notably, these years were difficult for the state government and for the
reputation of the incumbent governor, Gray Davis.  In 2001, California
experienced a massive energy crisis, which was blamed on the state’s
energy deregulation plan and subsequent mismanagement by Governor
Davis.  And from 2001 to 2003, California experienced economic
recession, state budget problems, or both.  Despite these issues, trust in
Table 3.2
Californians’ Trust in State Government,
2001–2004
% Who Trust State
Government Always
or Most of the Time
Preelection
January 2001 47
January 2002 47
November 2002 election season
August 2002 37
November 2002 35
Post–November 2002 election
February 2003 36
June 2003 34
September 2003 28
October 2003 27
Post–October 2003 recall
January 2004 27
May 2004 32
SOURCES:  PPIC Statewide Surveys (2001–2004).
NOTE:  N = approximately 2,000 per survey wave.
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state government first showed a decline during the 2002 election season.
By August 2002, fewer than four in 10 Californians said that they
trusted the government in Sacramento (37%).  In the following
months, trust remained at or below this level, with only 34 percent of
Californians saying they trusted state government by June 2003.  During
the recall election, trust in the state government declined further, and it
has not rebounded to the levels seen in the November 2002 preelection
survey as of this writing.
Some argue that it is difficult to attribute any changes in trust in
state government coincident with a political campaign to anything but
the campaign itself.  Rahn, Brehm, and Carlson (1999) argue that
changes in political trust during campaigns should be attributed to
campaigns rather than to other factors because there typically are no
other equally significant political events occurring at the same time.
Although California had experienced a number of political problems in
recent years—notably a serious budget deficit and an electric power
crisis—in the fall of 2002 the major political event was definitely the
gubernatorial election.  Other statewide and federal offices were in
contention at this time—including a U.S. Senate race and Congressional
and state legislative races—but there is no question that the gubernatorial
race drew the most attention from the media.
Although it could be argued that people feel more negatively about
campaigns because they are less trusting, the decline in trust that
occurred during the 2002 election campaign argues that the election
campaign affected political trust rather than the reverse.  For instance,
only the ratings of trust in state government changed over time, whereas
trust in the federal government remained stable.  As a result, a correlation
between trust in state government and negative feelings about political
campaigns should largely reflect the effect of campaigns on political trust
rather than the effects of low trust on feelings about political campaigns.
Even if other factors may be driving the loss of confidence in state
government, the causal relationship appears clear in the case of state
government.
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Correlates of Distrust in State Government
To examine the potential relationships between various factors and
trust in state government, we conducted a logit regression analysis for all
survey respondents, using independent variables that measured political
assessments, individual characteristics, and political engagement.  The
numerical results are reported in Appendix B.  Overall, we found that
political assessments, of both the incumbent governor, Gray Davis, and
perceptions of the campaign, were significantly correlated with trust in
state government.  In addition, certain individual characteristics, such as
party identification and ethnicity, were also related to political trust.  In
contrast, only one measure of political engagement—the level of interest
in politics—was significantly related to trust in state government.  We
discuss these findings in the remainder of this section.
It is important to note that both of our measures of political
assessments were significantly correlated with trust in state government.
One of the strongest predictors of trust was the perception of political
leaders; individuals who had a favorable opinion of Gray Davis were
much more trusting of state government.  In contrast, those who felt that
political campaigns in California had been getting worse were
significantly less trusting.
A few measures of individual characteristics were also correlated with
trust in state government.  When we accounted for attitudes toward the
Democratic incumbent governor, Gray Davis, both Independent voters
and strong Republicans expressed less trust than others in government.
In contrast, measures of conservative political ideology—gender, age,
education, and income—were unrelated to lower levels of trust.  Many
researchers have argued that there is a generation gap in trust, with
younger residents trusting in government less than older generations, but
this did not appear to be the case during the 2002 gubernatorial election
campaign.  As for race/ethnicity differences, Latinos were more trusting
of state government than other residents were.  The latter results are
consistent with past research on Latinos in California, which argues that
Latinos consistently feel more positive about both federal and state
government than do residents of other racial/ethnic backgrounds
(Baldassare, 2002).
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Finally, as noted above, only one measure of political engagement—
the level of interest in politics—was correlated with trust in state
government.  In this case, residents who were more interested in politics
reported higher levels of trust.  Other measures of engagement, including
attention paid to the news, exposure to campaign advertising, and the
level of political knowledge, were not significantly correlated with trust
in state government.  Despite our expectations that these other measures
would be correlated with political trust, when other factors were
considered they did not appear to be relevant.
Although the opinions of all residents clearly matter, political
campaigns often target likely voters rather than the population at large.
If feelings about political campaigns are less important to likely voters
than they are to the general population, candidates may not feel that the
loss of trust is relevant to their decisions about how to campaign.  The
observation that those who are more interested in politics were more
trusting suggests that likely voters may not be influenced by the same
factors that affect the population at large.  Were likely voters less trusting
in response to negative perceptions of the gubernatorial campaign?  We
ran an identical logit regression model only for likely voters, and the
numerical findings are reported in Appendix C.  The findings indicate
that political assessments had the same effect on trust for likely voters
that they did for California adults in general.  However, measures of
individual characteristics and political engagement were less significant
for likely voters’ reports of their trust in government.
In sum, the political assessments of the candidates and elections were
correlated with likely voters’ levels of trust in government the same way
that they were with all adults.  Those who felt more favorably toward
Gray Davis were significantly more trusting in state government.  Those
likely voters who felt that campaigns were getting worse, rather than
staying the same or getting better, were significantly less trusting.
Individual characteristics, however, were much less relevant to
political trust for the population of likely voters than they were for all
adults.  The only measure that was significantly correlated with political
trust for likely voters was being registered to vote as an Independent or
“decline to state.”  As in the general population, Independents felt
significantly less trust in state government than those who identified with
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political parties.  However, other measures, such as a strong Republican
Party affiliation, or identifying as Latino, were not correlated with trust
for likely voters.
Finally, none of the measures of political engagement were
significant predictors of political trust for likely voters.  Some of this
effect may result because likely voters in our survey sample are partially
identified on the basis of the question measuring interest in politics.  The
effects of political engagement measures may be more evident in the
general population than among voters (Finkel, 1985).  However, even in
the general population, only one of these measures had any noticeable
effect on political trust.
Overall, our expectation that assessments of political leaders and the
political system would influence the levels of trust in government seems
to be borne out in the analysis of our November 2002 survey.  In
contrast, only certain measures of individual characteristics appeared to
affect political trust in a significant manner.  The level of a respondent’s
political engagement on a number of dimensions did not appear to affect
trust in government much, although the level of interest in politics had
some effect.  Certainly, many other factors were driving the levels of
distrust toward historical lows in the months leading up to the
November 2002 election.  In the California context at this particular
time, the unattractive campaign for governor appears to have contributed
to a decline in trust in state government.  Moreover, trust in state
government remained at its new low after the close of the 2002
campaign, and it was to drop even further as California voters
confronted the historic events of 2003—the largest state budget deficit in
history and the first recall of a governor.
Conclusions
Most Americans report having more trust in their state government
than in the federal government, but California residents have shown a
pattern of trusting their state government less than, or at least no more
than, they do the federal government.  This trend became evident during
the 2002 governor’s race.
The empirical evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that
campaign perceptions are significantly related to the public’s level of
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trust in state government.  The relationship remains after accounting for
individual characteristics and various political factors.  At the close of the
2002 governor’s race, Californians with more negative perceptions of the
campaign also had lower levels of trust in state government.
Is trust in government relevant to the complex issues involved in
governing?  Some say that it is not, arguing that voter apathy and
disinterest can actually lead to a more politically stable environment and
that low trust in government is unrelated to the ability to govern
effectively (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Dahl, 1956; Moore,
2002).  However, others suggest that political trust and legitimacy are
important factors in governance. The observable effects of political
distrust can range from legislative gridlock, to difficulty in passing public
policy measures at the ballot box, to efforts to impose political reforms
on candidates and elected officials (Hetherington, 1998; Teixeira, 1992).
Although it is difficult to link the decline in trust in state
government directly to any particular set of policy outcomes, the recent
history of California politics suggests that the more dramatic predictions
about the effects of the loss of political trust may have some external
validity.  The current state of distrust in California politics may be a
major contributing factor to the demand for structural change through
the direct democracy process, such as citizens’ initiatives that call for
legislative term limits, fiscal constraints on elected officials, and
administrative change in the case of the Davis recall.  At the very least,
the current level of distrust provides a steady foundation for political
change.
What is even more striking in the California example reported here
is the further drift downward in trust in state government after the
November 2002 election.  In other words, the decline in trust that took
place before the election was not a temporary phenomenon.  Moreover,
the lack of recovery to earlier levels of trust in state government several
months after the October 2003 recall is noteworthy, especially because
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger has high job approval ratings (64% of
all adults; 69% of likely voters) according to the PPIC Statewide Survey
of May 2004.  This trend raises fundamental questions of what it takes
to repair trust when the public has lost a high degree of confidence.
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California residents, when asked about the current political process
in the state during the course of the election, expressed strong feelings
that political reform was needed.  Many said that campaigns were too
negative and that elections were too expensive.  In the absence of
desirable political campaigns and candidates, the state’s politics may
suffer negative consequences from the distrust and alienation that was
evident in November 2002 that extend far past a single election.  For
instance, this could result in less interest in registering to vote, a
declining turnout of voters in elections, and voters’ attraction to citizens’
initiatives that limit the powers and authority of the state’s elected
officials.  In the concluding chapter, we consider the types of political
and election reforms that have public support, and we assess their
chances for addressing the current trends of negative campaigning, low
voter turnout, and distrust in government.
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4. Conclusions on Public
Support for Campaign
Reforms
Given that California voters are unhappy with the way that
campaigns and elections are run in the state today, the question is what,
if anything, would they like to do about it?  Moreover, are the state’s
voters so dissatisfied with the political status quo that they would be
willing to increase their taxes to pay for campaign finance reforms?
These are the types of public policy preferences that we explore in this
final chapter.
For many of the possible campaign reforms, there could be legal
resistance for government regulation because of first amendment speech
and association rights.  So any election reforms one might want to
propose have to avoid constitutional problems and court challenges by
politicians, parties, and consultants who think that they benefit from the
ways in which campaigns are run today.  For example, our survey
indicates that voters are dissatisfied with negative advertising and
personal attacks.  An outright ban on negative advertising might be
appealing to a majority of California voters, but it would certainly not be
constitutional and would surely face legal challenges by those who make
a living off political commercials.
Among a smaller set of feasible political reforms, we tested public
attitudes toward four categories of measures:  campaign finance
restrictions, promoting more spontaneous and personal forms of
candidate-voter contact, public disclosure, and voluntarily adopted codes
of campaign conduct.  We review our findings for each of these reforms
below.  Most of these reforms are not new.  They have been the subject
of lengthy debate and careful discussion in California, in other states,
and in national commissions.  In many instances, the political will to
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implement these changes has been lacking.  The political establishment
has doubted the public’s interest in campaign and election reforms.
Our results indicate that—contrary to conventional wisdom of
indifference toward the political process—the public does want to see
substantive change in campaigns and elections.  California voters most
strongly favor more debates and would like to see the candidates adopt
some codes of conduct.  It is somewhat surprising that in the light of past
polls and elections, Californians in the heat of the 2002 governor’s race,
and especially likely voters, were even open to public financing as an
option in the future.  Apparently, many voters are even willing to pay
more to make improvements in what they see as an election process that
is broken and badly in need of change.  In this chapter, we learn that
many voters are eager to embrace proposals to improve California
elections (see Baldassare, Cain, and Cohen, 2003a, 2003b; Public Policy
Institute of California, 2003).
Campaign Finance Reform
The issue of campaign finance was prominent in the 2002 governor’s
race.  Gray Davis’s aggressive fund-raising tactics made more than a few
Democrats uneasy and raised questions about his ethics in the media,
eventually causing Davis to cancel some events and slow down the pace
of money-raising.  Against the backdrop of federal action on the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Californians might question the
relatively permissive regime we have in this state.  Before the passage of
Proposition 34, the state had only disclosure laws and no contribution
limits or public financing.  Proposition 34 introduced relatively high
limits on individual and group contributions but not public financing.
Moving to new campaign finance reforms may be difficult according
to our survey just before the November 2002 election.  To begin with,
voters are conflicted when asked what they think contributors should get
for their money.  About 49 percent of likely voters believe that
candidates should do nothing or merely say thank-you for the
contributions they get, whereas 39 percent of likely voters think that
candidates should give contributors either the policies they want or more
access to themselves.  To put it another way, there is a real divide
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between the large proportion of voters who think that the current system
of campaign finance is ethically acceptable and the substantial percentage
of voters who think it is not.
In recent years, some wealthy candidates have tried to turn the
public’s distrust about candidates’ accepting contributions to their
advantage by claiming that their personal wealth frees them from special
interest ties.  Apparently, this point of view is not shared by many of the
state’s voters.  Our survey indicates that fewer than one in five
Californians thought that it was best for candidates to use their own
money to finance their campaigns (i.e., the plutocrat’s virtue), whereas
38 percent thought that it was best to get money from supporters and 37
percent thought that money from the public was the best.  And perhaps
most surprising, given the fiscally conservative nature of Californians, 57
percent of likely voters thought that public financing was a good idea
(Table 4.1).
Conventional wisdom by the political establishment in California
has been that public financing was a nonstarter.  Among other reasons,
why would people want to pay for speeches by candidates that they
disagreed with or openly opposed in the heat of an election?  But the
experience of the 2002 election, and perhaps the fact that several states
and some California cities have experimented with public financing
Table 4.1
Californians’ Support for Funding Political Campaigns
“Would you favor or oppose having a system of public
funding for state and legislative campaigns in California,
even if it cost taxpayers a few dollars a year to fund?”
% of California
Adults
% of Likely
Voters
Favor 50 57
Oppose 46 39
Do not know 4 4
SOURCE:  PPIC Statewide Survey (November 2002).
NOTE:  N = 2,000.
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schemes, seems to have made many voters receptive to this option for
political reform.1
Candidate Debates
Californians have been telling us in surveys in recent years that they
are frustrated by the distance and superficiality of television-driven
statewide contests.  On Election Day in November 2002, many voters
apparently voted with their feet by staying away from the polls.  What
would they prefer instead?  Several questions in the survey deal with this
topic.  Clearly, voters would like a more intimate form of campaigning
than is feasible above the local level in this state:  Fifty-six percent of
likely voters said that they would feel more favorably about candidates
who campaigned primarily by going from door to door.  Unfortunately,
with Assembly, Senate, and Congressional districts of over one-half
million constituents, and a statewide electorate of 15 million people,
door-to-door campaigning is not a realistic option for all but the
physically fittest of candidates.
Although it is unlikely that voters will get to know statewide
candidates more personally, it might be possible for them to witness
candidates in more potentially spontaneous settings than the 30-second
television commercials that they are providing to voters today.  The
dominant trend in modern campaigning is to program candidates to
avoid mistakes and follow formulaic answers.  The ideal for some
political consultants would be to create the scripts, have their clients well
rehearsed in private, and then have the candidates read them in public.
Television advertisements rarely give much specific information about
candidates and their positions.  Settings where reporters get to ask
unscreened questions of the candidates, or where there is the possibility
that a candidate might look bad in a real-life interaction with actual
voters, are avoided by many political consultants at all costs.  Although
some reporters get to ask unscripted questions in interview settings,
_____________
1In a more recent survey, majorities of state residents (57%) and likely voters (54%)
said that they were opposed to spending a few dollars a year to support public funding for
state and legislative campaigns (PPIC Statewide Survey, September 2004).
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others are exposed to the candidates in only highly controlled
environments.
Even debates seem to pose “excessive” risks to some candidates.  The
incumbent governor agreed to only one debate, televised in a single
media market in the middle of the day during the 2002 governor’s race.
Although no one believes that the answers in debates are unscripted,
debates do present a chance for large numbers of voters to compare the
answers of the candidates on specific policy questions.  When asked
whether more debates in the 2002 gubernatorial contest would have
made the election campaign better or worse, nearly two-thirds of likely
voters said it would have made it better.  When asked if they would favor
or oppose an initiative that would require five prime-time broadcast
gubernatorial debates, 60 percent said they favored the idea (Table 4.2).
Thus, support for proposals that provide more contact with the
candidates suggest yet another clear area of reform.
It is unlikely that a measure that would require debate participation
would survive a court test.  A more defensible measure would be to set
up a debate format and a commission to administer it and then hope
that public expectations would induce participation in a series of high-
profile debates and town hall forums by all of the major candidates.
Table 4.2
Californians’ Support for Gubernatorial Debates
“Would you favor or oppose an initiative that required
candidates for governor to participate in a minimum
of five prime-time publicly broadcasted debates?”
% of California
Adults
% of Likely
Voters
Favor 60 56
Oppose 33 39
Do not know 7 5
SOURCE:  PPIC Statewide Survey (November 2002).
NOTE:  N = 2,000.
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Public Disclosure
Disclosure is a key component to a well-functioning electoral system.
Voters need to have access to good information if they are going to make
good choices.  Although the media often ask for the fullest possible
disclosure, candidates sometimes resist on the grounds that subjecting
key pieces of personal information to public scrutiny seems like an
unnecessary invasion of their privacy.  Candidates who enter the public
domain must necessarily surrender the privacy they enjoyed as private
citizens.  But does that mean that candidates have no right to privacy?
Just because the press wants to have the material for a story does not
mean that the information about a candidate necessarily serves an
important democratic purpose.  Where does one draw the line?
The line has moved toward shrinking the zone of privacy for
candidates.  A good example is the controversy over Bill Simon’s tax
forms during the 2002 California governor’s race.  Having filled out the
conflict of interest forms required by the state, Simon argued that since
he did not have to release his complete tax forms, he would not.
Members of the press argued that because Simon had no experience in
public office, and was running for office as a businessman and outsider,
the public had a right to know more about how he earned his money and
how much he paid in California taxes.  Moreover, a jury verdict on a
business deal and an investigation by the Internal Revenue Service of his
company’s affairs in a year of corporate scandals raised the media’s
interest in his tax records.  In the end, reporters were allowed to review
Simon’s taxes in a highly restricted setting.
We asked in our survey whether the respondent would feel more
favorably, less favorably, or no different toward candidates who released
their tax forms, their medical records, or information about campaign
contributions as soon as they received such contributions.  Given the
furor over Simon’s taxes, the results are somewhat surprising.  A majority
of likely voters (53%) said that they would feel no different about
candidates who released their tax forms, whereas about four in 10 said
that it would make them look at the candidates more favorably (Table
4.3).  An even larger percentage of likely voters (79%) said that they
would feel no different about candidates who released their medical
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Table 4.3
Californians’ Support for Public Disclosure
% of California
Adults
% of Likely
Voters
No difference if candidate:
Publicly released tax returns 53 53
Publicly released medical records 77 79
More favorable view if candidate:
Publicly released a list of campaign
contributors and amounts received
as soon as candidates got them 66 71
SOURCE:  PPIC Statewide Survey (November 2002).
NOTE:  N = 2,000.
records—an issue that came up in the 2000 presidential campaigns of
John McCain and Bill Bradley—whereas only about one in five
respondents said that this would make them look at the candidates more
favorably.
By far the more relevant piece of personal information for evaluating
candidates seems to be the immediate disclosure of campaign
contributions:  Seventy-one percent of likely voters said that this would
make them more favorably disposed toward a candidate, whereas about
three in 10 said that this would make no difference.  Obviously, this type
of private, financial information from the candidate is judged by the
public as having the most direct relevance to the current campaign and
future policy directions.
This survey finding points to a possible direction for political
reform.  California has taken some initial steps toward electronic
disclosure in recent years.  But there are questions about the expense and
user-friendliness of the software.  Also, there is no unique donor
identification that would allow reporters to track contributions at several
levels simultaneously.  The expense of running for office in California
and the wealth of groups and individuals who are would-be donors create
a need to follow the money trail in a much more systematic fashion.
Who supports which candidates financially and at what level are
important pieces of information California voters need to understand the
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likely influences that successful candidates will face after they are elected
to office.  Of course, the media would also probably need to increase its
role to present such information in a form that was readily available and
understandable to the state’s voters.
Candidate Codes of Conduct
Candidates for elected office cannot be compelled to avoid personal
attacks and negative campaigns for first amendment reasons.  But
perhaps they can be induced to do so by signing pledges that they could
be held accountable for during the course of a political campaign.  Our
survey suggests that California voters are open to this idea.
Seventy-seven percent of likely voters said that they would view
candidates more favorably (combining the much and somewhat
categories) if they signed a code of conduct to “run a truthful, fair, and
clean campaign” (Table 4.4).  Similarly, over 70 percent of likely voters
said that they would view a candidate more favorably if they signed a
code of conduct to run “an issue-oriented campaign.”  The support for
reforms among likely voters was almost equally high for candidates who
would sign a code of conduct “not to use race, gender, religion, sexual
orientation, or age as a basis for attack.”
Table 4.4
Californians’ Support for Codes of Conduct
“If a candidate signed a campaign code of conduct pledging
to run a truthful, fair, and clean campaign, would this make
you view him or her much more favorably, or somewhat
more favorably, or would it make no difference to you?”
% of California
Adults
% of Likely
Voters
Much more favorably 48 48
Somewhat more favorably 27 29
No difference 23 22
Less favorably, do not know 2 1
SOURCE:  PPIC Statewide Survey (November 2002).
NOTE:  N = 2,000.
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Perhaps some political consultants would prefer that their candidates
not sign such pledges, since it restricts their options in running a
campaign.  Moreover, it is difficult to predict whether these codes of
conduct would actually be followed by the candidates who adopted
them.  From the voter’s perspective, it seems like a worthy, low-risk, and
inexpensive experiment.  Candidates do not like to hear that they have
violated promises, so the act of getting them to sign pledges might on the
margin provide incentives for better conduct.  For the voters, it also
offers the welcome prospect of a campaign that is geared toward the
issues that matter most to them and a welcome respite from the business
of attacks and counterattacks.
The California public is dissatisfied with highly negative races and
the limited access they have to their candidates.  Their frustration was
evident in the course of the 2002 elections, according to our surveys.  It
peaked in 2003 when California voters took matters into their own
hands and removed an incumbent governor who, among many other
things, epitomized many of the undesirable aspects of modern
campaigning.
Recall elections are now part of the statewide political
landscape—not just the local election context as in the past.  Whatever
the merits and demerits of recall elections, they do not address the
underlying sense, especially felt by better informed and more involved
voters, that political dialogue is conducted at a demeaning and negative
level.  Indeed, we could find no evidence in our surveys since the
November 2002 election that attitudes toward campaigns and trust in
government changed in a positive way after the recall of Governor Gray
Davis and his replacement by Arnold Schwarzenegger in 2003.
The problem is that political consultants are paid to get their clients
elected, not to make voters feel happier about the process.  Political
campaigns today are not designed to increase voter turnout, or to
improve the public’s trust in government, or to shed a positive light on
elected officials or their challengers.  Many of the members of the
political establishment seem to have concluded that a candidate who
takes the high road against a candidate who takes the low one might lose
the war of attrition.  Moreover, his or her consultant will not be
rewarded for sacrificing the candidate to the cause of higher ethics or
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preserving civic sensibilities.  With increasing campaign expenses to run
for office, politicians and political consultants are under pressure to win
elections at all costs.
However, the survey evidence discussed in this report shows that
negative tactics hurt the candidate who initiates them as well as the
candidate who is the object.  Although the Davis campaign outspent the
Simon campaign and won the election while using negative attack
ads—following a consistent pattern that has existed in gubernatorial
elections since 1986—we noted several risks to this political strategy.
In the short run, the candidate can alienate his supporters and turn
them off to voting for anyone in the election.  This could spell defeat in a
close election in which the candidate needs every vote from supporters
(e.g., Davis won by only 5 percentage points).  In the long run, this can
also leave the winner vulnerable in a recall election such as the one faced
by Davis in October 2003.  Some Democratic voters were disinterested
in supporting a candidate that they grew to dislike during the election.
More important, the elected official may find that voters have less trust
in government and less respect for the elected officeholder because of the
way he or she behaved in the course of the campaign.  This raises
problems when an elected official needs support for policies and ballot
measures.  As we have seen in our survey, once confidence is lost it is
difficult to regain.
We hope that these survey findings will serve to dampen the appetite
for negativity as candidates think about their winning strategy in
statewide elections in 2006 and beyond.  The voters have also shown the
way to a new type of political campaigning in their survey responses to a
wide variety of different ideas for political and election reforms.  If there
is resistance to enacting such changes in the state’s political arena, then
we can anticipate that the California public will incorporate its
expectations about good campaigns into its evaluations in the voting
booth through the citizens’ initiative process.
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Appendix A
Dissatisfaction with the Candidate
Choices for Governor
Independent Variable Coefficient S.E.
Level of attention to the news (four-point scale) 0.47*** 0.06
Level of interest in politics (four-point scale) 0.26*** 0.07
Saw an ad for a gubernatorial candidate 0.03 0.11
Strong Democrat (dummy variable) –0.50*** 0.15
Strong Republican (dummy variable) –0.28 0.15
Independent (dummy variable) 0.49*** 0.15
Female (dummy variable) –0.05 0.10
White (dummy variable) 1.64*** 0.26
Latino (dummy variable) 0.49** 0.17
Constant –3.27*** 0.32
N 1901
Log likelihood 2361.68
Pseudo R2 0.18
SOURCE:  PPIC Statewide Survey (November 2002).
NOTES:  Figures are logit regression coefficients.  Dependent variable
is whether a respondent is dissatisfied with the choice of candidates for
governor.  N = 2,000.
**p < .01.
***p < .001.
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Appendix B
Trust in State Government, All Adults
Coefficient S.E.
Political assessments
Favorable ranking of incumbent governor Gray Davis
(dummy variable) 0.594** 0.184
Perception that election campaigns are getting worse
(dummy variable) –0.462* 0.184
Individual characteristics
Strong Democrat (dummy variable) –0.289 0.251
Strong Republican (dummy variable) –0.688* 0.297
Independent (dummy variable) –0.748** 0.271
Conservative (dummy variable) –0.004 0.210
Liberal (dummy variable) –0.059 0.210
Female (dummy variable) –0.013 0.168
White (dummy variable) –0.033 0.238
Latino (dummy variable) 0.577* 0.262
Youth, ages 18–34 (dummy variable) –0.013 0.185
Education (three-point scale) –0.033 0.125
Income (three-point scale) 0.050 0.118
Political engagement
Political activities (eight-point scale) –0.013 0.063
Interest in politics (four-point scale) 0.256* 0.129
Attention paid to the news (four-point scale) –0.197 0.110
Political knowledge (four-point scale) –0.039 0.090
Exposure to advertisements (dummy variable) 0.135 0.179
Constant –0.907 0.462
Na 754
Pseudo R2 0.14
Percentage correctly predicted 0.69
SOURCE:  PPIC Statewide Survey (November 2002).
NOTES:  Figures are logit regression coefficients.  Dependent variable is whether
respondent trusts the state.  N = 2,000.
aN is less than 2,000 because some questions were asked of a randomly split sample of
half of all respondents.
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
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Appendix C
Trust in State Government, Likely
Voters
Coefficient S.E.
Political assessments
Favorable ranking of incumbent governor Gray Davis
(dummy variable) 0.976** 0.290
Perception that election campaigns are getting worse
(dummy variable) –0.515* 0.261
Individual characteristics
Strong Democrat (dummy variable) –0.329 0.341
Strong Republican (dummy variable) –0.743 0.381
Independent (dummy variable) –0.875* 0.390
Conservative (dummy variable) –0.204 0.328
Liberal (dummy variable) –0.077 0.307
Female (dummy variable) –0.141 0.250
White (dummy variable) –0.015 0.352
Latino (dummy variable) 0.366 0.445
Youth, ages 18–34 (dummy variable) 0.206 0.312
Education (three-point scale) –0.149 0.187
Income (three-point scale) 0.271 0.169
Political engagement
Political activities (eight-point scale) 0.013 0.081
Interest in politics (four-point scale) –0.289 0.230
Attention paid to the news (four-point scale) –0.110 0.185
Political knowledge (four-point scale) 0.056 0.132
Exposure to advertisements (dummy variable) 0.368 0.278
Constant –0.451 0.806
Na        404
Pseudo R2 0.17
Percentage correctly predicted 0.75
SOURCE:  PPIC Statewide Survey (November 2002).
NOTE:  Figures are logit regression coefficients.  Dependent variable is whether
respondent trusts the state.  N = 2,000.
aNo. is less than 2,000 because some questions were asked of a randomly split
sample of half of all respondents.
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
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